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Abstract
Governance of the healthcare systems is one of the most important challenges for Western coun-
tries. Within this, an accurate assessment of the quality is key to policy makers and public
managers, in order to guarantee equity, effectiveness and efficiency. In this thesis, we investi-
gate aspects and methods related to healthcare evaluation by focussing on the healthcare system
in Lombardy (Italy), where public and private providers compete with each other, patients are
free to choose where to be hospitalized, and a pay-for-performance program was recently im-
plemented. The general aim of this thesis is to highlight the role of statistics within a quality
evaluation framework, in the form of advancing the statistical methods used to measure quality,
of evaluating the effectiveness of implemented policies, and of testing the effect that mecha-
nisms of competition and cooperation can have on the quality of a healthcare system.
We firstly advance a new methodological approach for measuring hospital quality, providing
a new tool for managers involved in performance evaluations. Multilevel models are typically
used in healthcare, in order to account for the hierarchical structure of the data. These models
however do not account for unobserved heterogeneity. We therefore propose an extension of
the cluster-weighted models to the multilevel framework and focus in particular on the case of
a binary dependent variable, which is common in healthcare. The resulting multilevel logistic
cluster-weighted model is shown to perform well in a healthcare evaluation context.
Secondly, we evaluate the effectiveness of a pay-for-performance program. Differently from
the existent literature, in this thesis we evaluate this program on the basis of five health out-
comes and across a wide range of medical conditions. Availability of data pre and post-policy in
Lombardy allows us to use a difference-in-differences approach. The statistical model includes
multiple dependent outcomes, that allow quantifying the joint effect of the program, and random
effects, that account for the heterogeneity of the data at the ward and hospital level. The results
show that the policy has overall a positive effect on the hospitals’ performance.
Thirdly, we study the effect of pro-competition reforms on the hospital quality. In Lombardy,
competition between hospitals has been mostly driven by the adoption of a quasi-market sys-
tem. Our results show that no association exists between hospital quality and competition. We
speculate that this may be the result of asymmetric information, i.e. the lack of transparent in-
formation provided to citizens about the quality of hospitals. This is bound to reduce the impact
of pro-competition reforms on quality and can in part explain the conflicting results found in the
literature on this subject. Our results should motivate a public disclosure of quality evaluations.
Regardless of the specifics of a system, hospitals are altruistic economic agents and they coop-
erate in order to improve their quality. In this work, we analyse the effect of cooperation on
quality, taking the network of patients’ transfers between hospitals as a proxy of their level of
cooperation. Using the latest network models, we find that cooperation does lead to an increase
in quality and should therefore be encouraged by policy makers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and literature review
The most common definition of National Healthcare Service (NHS) comes from the World
Health Organization (WHO) and it includes “all the activities whose primary purpose is to
promote, restore or maintain health” (WHO 2000). The NHS governance is one of the most
important challenges for the Western countries. Both ethical and spending implications, related
to the health of the population, require an improvement in the quality of services provided to the
citizens associated to a cost containment that guarantees the sustainability of the NHS.
The increasing in the expenditures which involved all the Western countries in the last decades,
induced several Governments to introduce reforms in NHS transforming the healthcare services
in a regulated market. The standard economic theory of how markets work is the model of sup-
ply and demand, where the main involved parties are the buyers and sellers. The buyers pay
sellers directly for the goods and services exchanged and the prices are the main mechanism
which coordinate the market. This classical theory works for many goods and services in the
economy, but it is reasonable to consider the healthcare market something different. First of
all third parties are involved in the process of goods and services exchange (governments, in-
surance, etc.), Second, patients do not really know what they need, the cost of the services and
the quality of the services. Third, in several countries the prices are fixed and not involved in
bargaining processes. Finally, the provided services relate to the citizens and not on stuffs. Al-
though these characteristics distinct the healthcare market from the classical economic theory,
several dynamics in the NHSs follow economic rules. The choice of a health care treatment
seems purely medical, but providers increasingly evaluate and compare alternative treatments
on economic aspects (Folland et al. 2007). Given that, it is easy to understand why quality as-
sessment in healthcare becomes a powerful tool for the governance of the dynamics between
1
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the public functions in order to protect the health of the population and the econonomic impli-
cations of the production of healthcare services. Indeed, good practices or critical points are the
most important feedback for policy makers in order to promote the governance of clinical needs,
use of services, and healthcare expenditures. The knowledge about critical points in the NHS
is the boost for policy interventions, which are the tools adopted to manage the development
of the NHS. Indeed, policy makers can modify the NHS radically by reforming the system or
introducing rules in order to get small but meaningful goals. Policy interventions can affect all
the organisations in the NHS such as hospitals or can interest specific individuals or units which
are the targets of the policy intervention. In this direction, the growing availability and quality
of administrative data has increased the opportunity for quantitative analysis and thus the need
for statistical tools aimed at evaluating the quality of care.
This work deals with the role of statistics in increasing the robustness of the quality evaluation
in health, and in evaluating the impact of reforms in healthcare on the quality provided to the
citizens in particular with the role of multilevel models to provide the more suitable statistical
tool for hospital quality evaluation. Furthermore, this work intends to study how the results of
the measures of evaluation can support policy makers in their decision process.
1.1.1 Quality in healthcare
Quality in healthcare is a broad concept covering several areas, characterized by two main di-
mensions: ex ante and ex post evaluation. Ex ante evaluation relates to the processes of care
and is typically defined by standards, evaluated in terms of achievement of these measures. The
most important example of this approach to the evaluation is the system promoted by the Joint
Commission, an independent, non-profit organization established in the USA in 1951 with the
aim of improving the quality of healthcare, by identifying and verifying a set of reference quality
standards. All these standards relate to the processes that characterize the hospital activity and
they are specifically formulated to be used in the different cultural and institutional contexts in
different countries: the standards centered on the patient monitor all the activities that directly or
indirectly concern the patients, while those centered on the organization monitor the processes
and actions that the providers put in place to maintain and improve the quality of care. Each
standard is composed by several elements that represent the concrete measures through which it
is possible to define the level of achievement of the standard. The standard proposed by the Joint
Commission can be applied to evaluate the activity of both hospitals and local health authorities.
Differently from ex ante evaluation, the ex post evaluation concerns the evaluation of what hap-
pens from the moment the patient is discharged from the hospital. This approach pertains to
several aspects of the hospital evaluation, such as the efficiency, the appropriateness, the cus-
tomer (patient) satisfaction and, in particular, the effectiveness.
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Hospital efficiency can be defined as the capacity to maximize the output (hospitalizations),
given the technology and the productive factors available (input). When there is a mismatch
between the output production and its optimal level, we are in the presence of inefficiency. In
this case, it is important to understand and explain the causes of this deviation, and in particu-
lar if it is due to technical or allocative inefficiency. In the first case hospitals should increase
their level of production, in the second case the healthcare system should re-allocate the input.
Hospital efficiency may be estimated using non-parametric methods (e.g. Data Envelopment
Analysis-DEA) or parametric methods (e.g. Stochastic Frontiers Analysis - SFA). Since the
original contribution of Aigner et al. (1977), SFA has been widely applied to measure hospitals’
efficiency because it allows to distinguish between inefficiency and random disturbances (dif-
ferently from DEA). For a review of studies using stochastic frontier analysis in the health care
sector see Rosko and Mutter (2008).
Appropriateness is another basic dimension for the ex post healthcare evaluation. It can be de-
fined as the ability of a hospital to provide services tailored to the needs of the patient, in the
right way and at the right time. As regards to hospital appropriateness, this can be assessed with
respect to both the adoption of opportunistic behaviors regarding to the payment systems (Berta
et al. 2010) and with respect to waiting times (Brekke et al. 2008, Siciliani and Hurst 2005).
The opportunistic behaviors lead to three distortions of the DRG payment system: upcoding,
cream skimming and readmissions. The upcoding practice consists in classifying a patient in a
DRG that produces a higher reimbursement (Dafny 2005). The cream skimming can be defined
in two ways: the selection of the more lucrative treatment or the selection of less complicated
patients (Levaggi and Montefiori 2003). Last, the readmission practice implies that the same
patient is discharged and admitted again after a short period, so that the hospital receives for the
same treatment more than one reimbursement.
Finally, customer satisfaction measures the experience of the hospitalization from the patient
point of view. Usually collected in the form of surveys, customer (patient) satisfaction can be
useful in order to improve healthcare services. Moreover, the availability and use of patient
satisfaction data have stimulated research investigating its relationship with other performance
measures, such as the effectiveness (Grillo Ruggieri et al. 2018).
In the healthcare literature, the most analzyed dimension of the ex post evaluation is the effec-
tiveness, and this is also what we consider in this thesis. Effectiveness is the expected level
of outcomes achievable as a result of the application of best practices in hospital activities. In
other words, effectiveness can be defined as the measure of the quality obtained from an appro-
priate provision of healthcare services. Effectiveness evaluation is based on the measure of the
outcomes, which represent factors and conditions that approximate the clinical quality. These
indicators do not measure the “true” effectiveness but feedback indications widely acceptable
to identify best practices and critical points in the services provided by the healthcare system.
The outcomes can be measured by exploiting the administrative data collected. This allows us
to use information already available without implementing new data sources, thus avoiding an
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increase of costs and administrative burdens associated with this eventuality. Furthermore, there
is the indisputable advantage of using information characterized by a high degree of homogene-
ity of contents, thanks to the collaboration between healthcare professionals and providers in
the definition of the guidelines for filling the data forms (Iezzoni 1997). The scientific literature
emphasizes that health outcomes can be measured in different ways. At the hospital level, exam-
ples include in-hospital mortality, post-discharge mortality or readmission within a specific time
measured in days (Krumholz et al. 2013, Laudicella et al. 2013, Normand and Shahian 2007).
However, differently from the most used mortality or readmission, quality evaluation consid-
ers several other outcomes such as unplanned return to the surgery room (Ansari and Collopy
1996, Leape et al. 1991) or the patients leaving hospital against the medical advice (Hwang et al.
2003).
The main issue about effectiveness evaluation concerns the statistical methods more suitable to
guarantee an appropriate quality assessment. Despite this topic being studied in the literature
(statistical, medical, economic, etc.) starting from the end of the eighties (Dubois et al. 1987),
the debate on the statistical tools suitable for the effectiveness evaluation is still evolving. Re-
cently in the US, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services promoted a research involving
Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation, Center for Outcomes Research and Evaluation
and a committee appointed by the Committee of Presidents of Statistical Societies, in order to
address statistical issues related to the hospital quality evaluation based on outcomes (Ash et al.
2012). Among several recommendation, this work concluded that multilevel generalized linear
models are the most effective approach in order to study data characterized by a hierarchical
structure. The milestone in the effectiveness evaluation based on multilevel models is the paper
by Goldstein and Spiegelhalter (1996) where statistical issues in the quality evaluation are dis-
cussed. The paper presents the use of multilevel models in order to estimate league tables of the
hospital performance as well as the limitations that can be faced in the risk-adjustment process
and in the model assessment. Risk-adjustment is a statistical approach that allows to consider
the patients’ characteristics (age, sex, socio-economic status, comorbidities, etc) to measure
risk, in order to provide a fair comparison of their adverse health outcomes. The most suitable
statistical approach does not produce an effective evaluation if it does not consider a proper risk-
adjustment. According to Iezzoni (1997), risk-adjustment is the only way to ensure an effective
ceteris paribus evaluation among the providers, avoiding to penalize hospitals accepting more
complicated patients.
All these considerations do not mean that, given approrpiate statistical tools and risk-adjustment
procedures, the findings coming from an effectiveness evaluation must be treated as the “true”
quality provided by each of the evaluated providers. In this sense, an illuminating discussion
about this topic can be found in the paper by Lilford et al. (2004) where the authors demonstrate
the caution that should be considered, when managing the results of an effectiveness evaluation.
The authors state that a bad performance can depend on several factors: first, the quality of the
collected data that can be heterogeneous among the providers; second, case-mix characteristics
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(ignored or unobservable) that are not included in the risk-adjustment models; finally, structural
or institutional issues, that affect the hospital performance, but are not attributable to the hospi-
tals (Lilford et al. 2004).
These reasons motivate the need for more advanced statistical models, such as those dealing
with multiple outcomes and longitudinal data, and partly set a word of caution in the interpreta-
tion of the output of these models and their use for hospital evaluations.
Considering the growing availability of tools for quality evaluation, several Countries intro-
duces new reforms aimed at boosting quality in healthcare: the so-called pay-for-performance
(P4P) programs. The adoption of a P4P approach is intended to improve the quality of health-
care systems by supplying financial incentives to the healthcare providers that achieve specified
quality benchmarks. Every P4P is based on the evaluation of the quality delivered. Although in
healthcare quality is a broad concept, the most common meaning of P4P refers to the impact on
effectiveness (Alshamsan et al. 2010). In the last few years there has been a growing interest in
applying P4P programs to the healthcare system in many countries (see e.g. Eijkenaar (2012),
Fillmore et al. (2014), Glickman et al. (2007), Pink et al. (2005)), but mixed results have been
reported about the impact of these programs on the quality of care. The aim of these studies is
to show that P4P schemes increase hospital quality, but often it is difficult to identify a causal
effect between the performance improvement and the policy adoption. Furthermore, in several
cases, due to the restricted accessibility to data, it is not possible to evidence the effect of P4P
schemes on multiple health outcomes. Hence, the analysis is usually performed on one health
outcome, and over a certain number of diseases. The opportunity to demonstrate the effect of
a P4P program on multiple outcomes and over a wide range of hospital activities is one of the
aims of this thesis.
1.1.2 Competition and cooperation in healthcare
A great debate exists, both at the national and international level, on the role of competition in
different sectors of the economy, including the health care sector. In recent years, many govern-
ments have introduced competition among health care providers to meet the growing demand
for health care in a climate of fiscal austerity. These interventions originate from a well-known
theoretical result in economics: when prices are fixed and firms compete, a higher degree of
competition is likely to produce better quality. Competition in healthcare is implemented al-
lowing patients’ choice for public services. The belief is that by stimulating patients’ choice,
hospitals become more responsive to patient demand driving in this way to an increase in the
provided quality. Literature in health economics have gathered empirical evidence on the ef-
fects of competition in the health care sector, finding mixed results on the size and direction
of these effects (Gaynor 2006). Some empirical studies demonstrated that more competition
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among hospitals leads to better health outcomes (Gaynor et al. 2012) whereas other studies re-
ject this hypothesis, arguing that more competition may harm patients’ health (Propper et al.
2004).
Several factors exist that may shape how competition between hospitals impacts quality. A first
factor is related to how competition is implemented in healthcare systems in which prices are
fixed. In some countries, such as the UK, the criteria are dependent on hospital market perfor-
mances whereas other countries boost hospital competition by providing patient information on
where to obtain the best treatment. Italy encourages competition by expanding patient choice
sets and offering private hospitals per-treatment public reimbursement funding (Gaynor et al.
2012, Kessler and McClellan 2000, Moscone et al. 2012, Propper et al. 2004, Tay 2003). The
degree of hospital competition also depends on the degree of patients’ freedom of choice of
where to be treated. Some markets have complete freedom (e.g. the USA) (i.e. patients can
choose any hospital in the relevant market) whereas others have limited freedom (e.g., Italy) ei-
ther because patients are free to choose but do not know the hospital quality or because they must
select between a limited number of hospitals (Beckert et al. 2012, Cooper et al. 2011, Moscone
et al. 2012, Tay 2003, Varkevisser et al. 2012). A third factor (hospital competitive strategy)
describes how hospitals compete with other hospitals. In some markets, hospitals can choose
both prices and quality (e.g. the USA ), whereas, in others (e.g. the UK and Italy), prices are
regulated by a central or local government and the providers can compete only through quality
that is usually measured in terms of a set of health outcomes (Cooper et al. 2011, Kessler and
McClellan 2000, Tay 2003). Finally, the degree of competition depends on the level of hospital
information available to patients when they choose where to be admitted. In some markets, like
the USA and the UK, patients are fully informed since hospital rankings are publicly advertised.
In other countries (e.g. Italy), patients are free to choose but, as they are not privy to hospital
rankings, this choice is mainly based on informal information such as word of mouth, reputation
and the media (Dranove et al. 2003, Dranove and Sfekas 2008).
Under these circumstances, although top quality hospitals will attract more patients, the inten-
sity of such an effect will depend on the hospital market structure. For example, if the hospital
is a local monopolist, the effect is negligible since only those who are willing to travel long
distances provide the incremental number of attracted patients. If, on the contrary, the hospi-
tal is operating in a market structure with other hospitals acting as nearby competitors, we can
imagine two effects. The first is a short-run effect, whereby the top quality hospital attracts
more patients (as limited by bed capacity), gains market share and is subject to less competition
because it enjoys a quality difference compared with its competitors. The second is a long-term
effect whereby competitors will react to the quality gap and (at least those remaining in the mar-
ket) will also raise their levels of quality. This implies that, in the long run, market shares may
even be unchanged compared with those existing before the quality gap.
The situation changes completely in the case of asymmetric information. Under this scenario,
patients tend to choose the nearest hospital or base their decision on informal information. The
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latter may be based on GP referrals and neighbour assessments. For example, patients may use
information about the decisions of people living in the same area and have or had the same
pathology as those who must make comparable decisions. Friends, relatives or trusted people
who have experienced similar health problems may also act as filters for the quality of hospitals,
thus shaping individual preferences. However, as also emphasized by Moscone et al. (2012), in-
teracting and sharing information with neighbours does not necessarily help in selecting a high
quality hospital. Under this scenario, high quality hospitals may fail to attract more patients.
Even if institutions have implemented measures to increase competition between hospitals, such
measures may not obtain the returns from investing in quality (e.g. hiring the best physicians,
buying the most expensive equipment and adopting costly control procedures in internal oper-
ations). Patients have a difficult time recognizing better quality hospitals and, hence, hospitals
may not have an incentive to increase quality. To sum up, in a situation in which asymmetric
information exists and prices are fixed, increasing competition may not produce an effect on
health outcomes.
Despite competition is an important determinant of hospital management, hospitals, motivated
by reasons such as convenience or altruism, may decide to engage in mutually beneficial co-
operation with each other. Competition and cooperation can in fact coexist as they do not lead
to mutually exclusive strategies, and they can both have an impact on hospital quality. The de-
mand for wider health-care coverage requires that hospitals and other health-care organizations
integrate their resources and expertise by creating inter-organizational linkages. Hospitals must
coordinate their actions, operations, and plans to serve the public interest (Gittell and Weiss
2004) in several ways. First hospitals could share they resource in terms of facilities but also in
terms of human resources. They could share the manager ability and moreover they can share
the knowledge and skills of their physicians. Furthermore, hospitals can cooperate sharing their
patients. Patient-sharing practices diffuse and grow in importance, but it remains unclear what
drives these collaborations and if it leads to increase the healthcare quality. Iwashyna (2012) in
their review of the literature on the transfer of critically ill patients, concludes that the destination
of patients is not necessarily chosen on the basis of objective evidence about the performance
and capabilities of the receiving hospital. Despite this, it is argued that stimulating hospital coop-
eration in terms of patient sharing relations means that appropriate patients could be transferred
from lower to higher quality hospitals (Iwashyna et al. 2009). Nevertheless, while competition
is extensively studied in the literature, cooperation and its impact on quality is relatively less
investigated. In this thesis we investigate the relationship between cooperation and quality, and
whether hospital cooperation increases the quality provided to the citizens.
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1.2 Case study: Lombardy
In this thesis we investigate the Regional Healthcare System (RHS) of Lombardy (Italy), as an
interesting case-study. The choice of Lombardy as case-study is due to the dimensions of the
RHS as well as to the rules defining this healthcare system. Lombardy is the most populous
region of Italy: it counts 10 million of citizens, and it is also one of the wealthiest, best educated
and richest regions in Europe. Lombardy devotes each year roughly 18 billion euro to the health-
care system, and is composed by roughly 200 financed hospitals, 51% of which are public. Each
year approximately 1,500,000 hospitalizations are delivered, and 10% of these concern patients
living in a different region. This makes this region comparable to many European countries.
The organization of the healthcare system in Lombardy is another reason to study this RHS.
In Lombardy the RHS is based on competition, which means that public and private providers
deliver hospital services and patients are free to choose where to be hospitalized. Furthermore,
in Lombardy there is an effective P4P program, and hospitals cooperate with each other.
Before describing the details of the RHS in Lombardy, we start with a summary of the Italian
NHS. At the beginning of the XX century and up to the fifties. the Italian NHS was based on
a compulsory insurance system, where several workers’ funds were usually financed jointly by
employers and employees. The main problem was that only 90% of citizens had an healthcare
coverage (i.e. free-lance workers were excluded) and different services were provided depend-
ing on the belonging to different workers’ funds. We can say that equity was far from being a
characteristic of the Italian healthcare system at that time. This situation radically changed in
1978 with the national reform n.833, when Italy adopted a Beveridge healthcare system. This is
one of the framework existing in the world to organize a NHS, and is commonly adopted in most
of the European countries. It takes the name from the UK liberal economist William Beveridge
who was designated by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to design a welfare system for the UK
after the Second World War (Beveridge et al. 1942). This model of healthcare system has two
main pillars: is universalistic, namely healthcare is guarantee to all the citizens, and it is free
for all, even if, in order to reach a balance in spending, some shrewdness is adopted. Following
this organizational model, the Italian healthcare system is funded by taxation, and each citizen
contributes in healthcare financing on the basis of its economic resources.
A second reform process was defined by two acts of the Italian government, in 1992 and in
1993 respectively. According to these two reforms the role of financing and programming the
healthcare system have been separated from the providers of the healthcare services. The central
government preserved the role of financing the entire healthcare system and defining the essen-
tial level of assistance, whereas each Italian region was deputed to define its own healthcare
system. This was the first step in defining 21 different healthcare systems (one for each region)
within the Italian healthcare system, a process that was completed with the constitutional reform
in 2001.
Chapter 1. Introduction 9
In 1997 the Lombardy region exploited the national reform and designed a specific regional
healthcare system. The regional law n.31 in 1997 transformed the Lombard RHS in a quasi–
market, where the healthcare services are financed by the central government but not necessarily
delivered by public providers (Colombo 2008). The main characteristics of this new healthcare
system can be summarized in: 1) the separation between purchasers (Local Health Authorities -
LHA) and providers (hospitals), 2) the competition between private and public providers and 3)
freedom of choice of the hospital where to be admitted (Brenna 2011). Furthermore, Lombardy
was one of the first regions in Italy who completely adopted a prospective payment system based
on the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). This type of payment system, invented and adopted
in the US at the beginning of the eighties (Hsiao et al. 1986), has been implemented in Lombardy
to increase the cost-efficiency of the hospital care (Barbetta et al. 2007). Instead of receiving a
reimbursement according to the volume of hospitalizations provided, each hospital (private or
public) receives a fixed reimbursement for each discharge according to a tariff established by re-
gional law at the beginning of each year. The hospitals admitted to this form of public financing
are those included in the healthcare system on the basis of certain requirements, established and
monitored by the regional healthcare directorate (Vittadini et al. 2012).
In Lombardy a budget constrain limits the annual hospital reimbursement. The yearly hospital
budget assignment is based on a bargaining between the hospitals and the regional officers. At
the end of a year, there is an agreement between the managers of each hospital and the regional
managers on the overall budget that each hospital can receive for the provided hospitalizations.
This is a monetary cap and the hospital managers are free to choose how to allocate the patients’
discharges in terms of DRG in order to not overcome this cap. Hospital managers may decide to
allocate hospital’s resources in the different wards according to the different remuneration levels
provided by the DRG-tariffs scheme (Martini et al. 2014).
Starting from 2012, a new extra-budget is devoted to each hospital based on their performance
evaluated on hospital outcomes. According to this effectiveness evaluation, the budget of each
hospital is increased or decreased up to +2% or -2% respectively. In Italy, Lombardy is the only
region adopting this type of policy, using quality evaluation in order to remodulate the hospital
budget.
As anticipated, in Lombardy each year roughly 1,500,000 of hospitalizations are delivered to
citizens living in Lombardy. In Figure 1.1 the trend of the hospitalizations in the last six years
is presented, distinguished by total amount, number of ordinary hospitalizations (excluded day-
hospitals, palliative cares and rehabilitation), total of hospitalizations in day-hospital and day-
surgery. The trend of the ordinary hospitalizations is decreasing in the last years in order to
increase the appropriateness of the hospitalizations and the efficiency of the system, and this
is balanced by the increasing in the admissions in day-surgery, while other hospitalizations are
delivered in outpatient treatment. Hospitals in Lombardy are dislocated in the entire region,
with a predominant amount in the metropolitan area of Milan. Figure 1.2 shows the hospitals’
location in the Region, distinct between private and public providers, and we can observe that
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FIGURE 1.1: Number of hospitalizations in Lombardy from 2012 to 2017
private providers are mostly located in Milan, Brescia and Bergamo in the middle of the region.
Furthermore, the map in Figure 1.2 shows that all the territory of the region presents a good
coverage which is reduced in the mountain area in the north of the region. The location of the
providers has an impact when we study hospital competition, where patients’ choices is a driver
of the competition and the distance between the patients’ home and the hospital is the main
covariate explaining these choices. The healthcare system in Lombardy is also characterized
by 23 teaching hospitals and 21 monospecialized hospitals dedicated to cardiology, neurology
and orthopaedics, defining a complete healthcare system where the supply for the citizens is
qualified.
1.3 Data
In Lombardy healthcare system quality evaluation is based on the administrative data gathered
from the regional healthcare information system, and it refers to the whole set of hospitaliza-
tions (Schede di Dimissione Ospedaliera, here-in-after SDO) provided in Lombardy. The SDO
data source was defined by the Italian Ministry of Health in 1991. All the hospitals belonging
to the national healthcare system must send the data concerning each provided hospitalization
to the regional information system and each year the Italian regions send this set of data to
the Ministry of Health. The information collected in the SDOs include patient’s demographic
data (e.g. age, sex, residence, education), characteristics of the hospitalization (e.g. hospital
of admission, discharge ward) and clinical features (e.g. principal diagnosis, concomitant di-
agnosis, interventions). Each SDO record is distinct by an anonymous code that identifies the
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FIGURE 1.2: Number of hospitalizations in Lombardy from 2012 to 2017
document that cannot be used to discover the identity of the patient. In order to manage the data
it is important to define a unique key for the hospitalization and this can be obtained concate-
nating the information related to the hospital of admission, the identifier of the hospitalization
and the date of admission. In each SDO the clinical information of the hospitalization is col-
lected in several items. First of all in each hospitalization a principal diagnosis is indicated, and
then, up to five co-diagnosis which can complicate the severity of the patients can be indicated.
For the surgical admission the main procedure delivered to the patient is indicated and up to
five secondary procedures can be included. The information in terms of diagnosis and surgical
procedures allows to obtain the DRG associated to the hospitalization. Furthermore, there are
several algorithms which can be used to combine diagnosis and DRG in order to obtain a set
of comorbidities affecting the patients. In particular, the Charlson (Charlson et al. 1987) and
the Elixhauser (Elixhauser et al. 1998) algorithms are widely adopted. Finally, the information
related to the reimbursement can be used in order to perform cost-effectiveness analysis. Orig-
inally conceived for economic- management purposes, the SDO are currently used for clinical-
epidemiological studies and to support health planning activities, as well as for monitoring the
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clinical hospital risk. Furthermore, the quality of this information is a characteristic that allows
researchers to use SDO for hospital quality evaluation. In Lombardy, the SDO data source is
recognized for having a good quality and a high level of internal coherence. A wide activity of
control of the way the hospitals collect data in the SDO data source has been performed during
the last fifteen years. In specific, in each Lombard LHA a team of selected professionals check
the consistency of the SDO in comparison with the clinical documents stored in the hospitals,
for about 10% of the annual discharges (roughly 150,000 hospitalizations).
1.4 Multilevel models for predicting quality
As mentioned before, a quite extensive literature suggests that multilevel models offer solutions
for studying relationships between health outcomes and covariates in complex hierarchical data
structures, considering both individual and aggregate levels of analysis (Christiansen and Mor-
ris 1997, Goldstein and Spiegelhalter 1996, Leyland and Boddy 1998, Leyland and Goldstein
2001, Normand et al. 1997, Rice and Leyland 1996). Healthcare data are usually characterized
by a hierarchical structure. Patients hospitalized in different hospitals define a hierarchy in the
data, and this implies that both patients and hospital membership influence each others. Ignor-
ing this relationship risks invalidating the use of ordinary statistical tools for data analysis A
first issue depending on ignoring the hierarchal structure relates with the assumptions behind
the underlying statistical tests, that treat the data as an independent random sample. If we accept
that patients admitted in a hospital are more alike to patients admitted in a different hospital,
the assumption of independence is violated, and, therefore, the validity of the statistical tests is
disputable. A second order of issues relates with the level of aggregation of the data. If we deal
with a hierarchy in the data, we can read the results of our analysis at the aggregated data level
(hospitals in our framework) or individual (patients). In this case we can face a problem of eco-
logical or atomistic fallacy, which consist respectively on analysing data at the individual level
and drawing erroneous conclusions at the aggregated one or viceversa. In order to overcome the
challanges related to the hierarchical structure of the data, the statistical literature has introduced
multilevel models. An extensive introduction to multilevel models can be found in Hox (1995),
Goldstein (2010), and Snijders and Bosker (2012).
Let (X, Y ) be defined in some finite space Ω ⊆ Rd × R, where Y is the response variable and
X the vector of level-1 covariates. We view the data as having a two-level structure with lower
level observations (level-1), nested within higher level observations (level-2).
To indicate the level-2 unit that individual i belongs to, we add a second subscript j so that yij
is the value of Y for the i-th individual in the j-th second level unit, and xij is the obervation for
one covariate X for the i-th individual in the j-th second level unit. Let us suppose that there
are J level 2 observations with nj level-1 observations in the j-th second level unit, so that the
total sample size is n = n1 + · · ·+ nJ . Let us assume that the mean of Y is ν and υ = f(ν) is
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the function that links the expected values of Y to the predicted values given by the regression
model. Then multilevel models, following the notation in Hox and Roberts (2011), are defined
as:
υj = Xjβ +ZjU j , (1.1)
where υj is the nj × 1 vector of expected values of Y for each j level-2 unit, Xj is the nj × d
matrix of the covariates, β is the d × 1 vector of the fixed parameters. Zj is the nj × r matrix
for the r subset of covariates included in the model as random effects, andU j is the r×1 vector
of the unknown random effects, distributed as a Nr(0, τ 2). Considering for simplicity a model
with only one random covariate the formulation becomes:
υj = β0j + β1jXj (1.2)

















When a Gaussian dependent variable is considered, the model includes an individual error term
εij , which is assumed to be distributed as a N(0, σ2).
Multilevel models account for the correlations among observations in the same cluster. In the







where σ2 is the variance of the individual error term in the model (Snijders and Bosker 2012).
When a Gaussian random slope model is adopted, and considering for simplicity a multilevel
model including one covariate X , the ICC depends on the values of X , and assumes this formu-
lation:
ICC(yij , yi′j) =
τ20 + τ01(xij + xi′j) + τ
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where xij and xi′j are the values of X for two observations belonging to the same group j
(Goldstein et al. 2002).
The Restricted Maximum Likehlihood (REML) approach is adopted in order to estimate the
parameters of multilevel models (Corbeil and Searle 1976, Patterson and Thompson 1971). In
a multilevel framework, maximum likelihood estimation produces biased estimates for the pa-
rameters because it does not consider the heterogeneity induced by the clusters observed at the
second level. REML allows to obtain unbiased estimates, separating the estimation of the fixed
part from the random part of the model.
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1.5 Contribution of the thesis
Chapter 2 in this thesis relates to the statistical evaluation of quality in healthcare. The results
of an outcomes’ evaluation based on classical statistical tools such as multilevel models, can
be affected by unobserved heterogeneity. This is typically captured by finite mixture models
which, however, do not capture observed heterogeneity. In chapter 2, we develop an extension
of the cluster-weighted mixture model (Ingrassia et al. 2012; 2015) to the multilevel framework,
in order to account for both known and latent structures of the data. Furthermore, we develop an
Expectation-Maximization algorithm for parameter estimation and a parametric bootstrap ap-
proach for assessing the variability of the estimators.
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the methodological presentation of the extension
of the cluster weighted models to the multilevel logistic framework. A simulation study follow
this methodological part and then an application to real data is provided. The main variables
included in the application concern the mortality, used as dependent variable of the models, and
some covariates. Mortality is calculated from the SDO where the date of death for the patients
is included and this allows us to calculate if the patient dies within 30 days after the discharge or
not. The comorbidity index is calculate using the Elixhauser algorithm (Elixhauser et al. 1998),
whereas the DRG weight is a characteristic of the DRG. The inclusion of sex and age complete
the risk adjustment process.
In Chapter 3, we evaluate the effectiveness of the P4P program adopted in our case-study, on
the basis of five health outcomes and across a wide range of medical conditions. The policy
evaluation is based on a difference-in-differences approach (Abadie 2005). The main variables
involved are the five outcomes, which are calculated using the SDO. Mortality is calculated as
describe before, while readmission is calculated using the anonymous identifier of the patient:
once a patient is discharged from an hospital, we search in the following SDO if the same person
is admitted for the same MDC within 45 days. Return in the surgery room is calculated within
the same hospitalization and only for surgical admissions, whereas transfer is identified as a
patient discharged from an hospital and admitted to another one in the same day or within 24
hours. Voluntary discharges is declared by the hospital in a variable included in the SDO. The
risk adjustment process is completed including in the model the following covariates: sex, age,
DRG weight and comorbidities. The model is also controlled by hospital characteristics such as
ownership, teaching status, level of technology and if the hospital is monospecialized or general.
In Chapter 4 we study the effect of competition on adverse hospital health outcomes in Lom-
bardy, a pro-competitive context where information about hospital quality is not publicly avail-
able. Although risk-adjusted hospital rankings are estimated yearly in this region, such rankings
are provided only to hospital managers and are not available to general practitioners or citizens.
Hence, patients may choose the hospital where to be admitted on the basis of different criteria.
n this chapter we include the same variables discussed before in order to study the effect of the
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competition on the health outcome, but what diversifies this chapter is a first stage where we
study the patients’ choices. In this part of the chapter we are able to include the distance from
the place where the patient live to the hospital location. This variable is the main driver of the
patients’ choices. Predicted patients’ choices give us the opportunity to calculate an index of
competition which is used in the model relating competition and quality. This index is exten-
sively presented in the chapter.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we analyse the role of cooperation in stimulating quality in healthcare
in Lombardy. To this aim, we exploit the statistical models developed in the growing field of
network science. First, we use a social relations model to identify the determinants of hospital
transfers, and then we use the predicted transfers to test whether there exists a relationship be-
tween these flows and the quality of origin and destination hospitals. In this chapter we use the
patients transfers calculated as in Chapter 3, and they are adjusted using age and DRG weight
together with the number of hospital discharges and an index indicating the degree of centrality
of each origin and destination hospital in the network. In the step of the analysis where we study
the effect of the cooperation on quality we also include the hospital ownership in order to study
if there is a different behavior according the public or private status of the hospitals.
1.6 Publications
Chapter 2
A reduced version of this chapter is published on the proceeding of the conference CLADAG
2017, organized by the Italian Society of Statistics, with this reference:
Berta P, Pennoni F, Vinciotti V (2017). Outcome evaluation in healthcare: the multilevel logistic
cluster weighted model. In: Book of Short Papers CLADAG 2017. p. 1-6, ISBN: 978-88-99459-
71-0, University of Milano-Bicocca Milan (Italy), 2017.
Furthermore, this chapter is under review for publication in Statistical Analysis and Data Mining
as a joint work with my supervisor Veronica Vinciotti.
Chapter 3
This chapter is based on a joint paper written with my colleague Alina Peluso and my supervisor
Veronica Vinciotti, which is published in Empirical Economics with this reference:
Peluso A, Berta P, Vinciotti V (2018). Do pay-for-performance incentives lead to a better health
outcome?, DOI: 10.1007/s00181-018-1425-8, Forthcoming.
Chapter 4 This chapter is based on a paper published with my second supervisor Francesco
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Statistical Society. Series-A. Statistics in Society, vol. 179, p. 907-926, ISSN: 0964-1998.
Chapter 5 This chapter is a joint work with my supervisors Veronica Vinciotti and Francesco
Moscone.
Chapter 2
Quality evaluation in health using
cluster weighted models
As discussed in Chapter 1, the performance of hospitals is usually evaluated by multilevel mod-
els. Performance evaluation based on administrative data deals with individual information
about patients which are nested within the hospitals where they are admitted. This is a hier-
archical data structure and we assume that patients admitted to a hospital are more alike that
patients admitted to another one. This assumption implies that the independence between ob-
servations is violated and linear models cannot be considered. In these cases, multilevel models
must be adopted, assessing in this way the variability within and between hospitals. Despite the
multilevel model allows us to consider the heterogeneity for observed groups, this is not suitable
for data with unobserved heterogeneity. Even if risk-adjustment and observed heterogeneity can
be asessed by multilevel models, as stated by Lilford et al. (2004), there is a source of varia-
tion influencing hospital quality evaluation which cannot be measured or observed. This latent
variability can systematically influence the outcomes and depends on factors such as lifestyle
(smoking, physical activity, drinking, etc.) or previous clinical conditions. These factors affect
patient severity but we cannot include them in a risk-adjustment model because they cannot
be measured or observed. The effect of this latent source of unobserved heterogeneity leads
to the variation of the regression coefficients between groups of individuals sharing similar but
unobserved characteristics. To overcome such drawbacks, in this chapter we propose a multi-
level cluster-weighted model for binary dependent variables, a new mixture model approach for
handling hierarchical data. This approach is applied to the healthcare context where often the
outcomes are dichotomous, and allows us to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the hospitals
through a family of multilevel models, each of them describing a different sub-population of
patients.
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2.1 Finite mixture models
The application of multilevel models requires that data have a natural hierarchical structure,
where patients are nested into wards and hospitals. In cases when a natural grouping in the data
is unknown but one expects latent groups, finite mixture models allow to account for this hetero-
geneity in the response distribution by splitting the population into a finite number of relatively
homogeneous classes (McLachlan and Peel 2000). The finite mixture framework is then charac-
terized by the idea that sometimes data can be observed as a composition of different groups in
which the observations can be clustered to better represent their heterogeneity. Assuming that a
given population Ω can be partitioned into C groups, say Ω1, . . . ,ΩC , we refer to finite mixture






where p(y; Ωc) is the density of Y within group c and wc are non-negatives constants varying
from 0 to 1 and the sum of which is equal to 1. In a mixture framework, the wc are called the
mixing weights and p(y; Ωc) are the component densities of the mixture (McLachlan and Peel
2000).
In a regression framework, Y is conditioned on a d-dimensional vector of covariatesX , and the





2.2 Cluster weighted models
Ingrassia et al. (2012) have generalized the framework described in the previous section by in-
troducing the so-called Cluster-Weighted Model (CWM). Here, the joint density of the response
and the covariates is clustered into groups. This results in a mixture of local models, which
are represented by the conditional densities of the response given the covariates within a group,
weighted both by the local densities of the covariates, which are typically not considered within
standard mixture regression models, and the usual mixing weights.





where p(y|x; ξc) is the conditional density of Y given X in Ωc, which depends on a vector
of parameters ξc, φ(x;ψc) is the marginal density of x in Ωc, which depends on a vector of
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parameters ψc, and wc is the weight of Ωc in the mixture (with wc > 0 and
∑C
c=1wc = 1).
The set of all parameters of the model is denoted by θ, and is given by
θ = (w1 . . . wC−1, ξ1 . . . ξC ,ψ1, . . . ,ψC).
Once the model is fitted to data, the units of the population are classified to the clusters according
to their posterior probability:




The relationship between CWMs and standard finite mixture models, as defined in Section 2.1,
is explained in Ingrassia et al. (2012). In particular, the authors have theoretically illustrated that,
when the marginal part of the model, which relates to the distribution of X , does not depend
on the latent groups, CWM contains the finite mixture of Gaussian (Everitt and Hand 1981,
McLachlan and Peel 2000) and the finite mixture regression models (McLachlan and Peel 2000,
Wedel and DeSarbo 1995) as special cases.
In general, accounting for the distribution of X within each latent group is what distinguishes
CWM from standard finite mixture models.
2.3 Multilevel regression mixture models
When both known and latent groups have to be modelled, a strand of research has proposed
an extension of the standard mixture models of Section 2.1 to the multilevel setting in order to
disentangle latent classes within the natural groups in the data (Asparouhov and Muthén 2008,
Muthén and Asparouhov 2009, Vermunt 2005).
Let us consider a multilevel model as defined in Chapter 1, but we now let the regression of
Y on the vector of covariates X for the patient i in the hospital j vary across a patient-level
latent class c. In this case, we estimate one multilevel for each latent group, and the multilevel
regression mixture is defined as
υj = Xjβc +ZjU cj (2.5)
where the suffix c in the vectors of parameters identify the C multilevel models that will be
estimated.
Considering for simplicity one random covariate, the model becomes:
υj = β0jc + β1jcXj (2.6)
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Conditioning on the sub-population Ωc, the distribution of Y |X will be denoted by p(yij |xij ;λc),
where λc = (β0c, β1c, τ20c, τ
2
1c, τ01c) is the vector of the parameters of the conditional distribu-
tion of y|x, for c = 1, . . . , C.
Here, the posterior probability of the c-th group for the multilevel mixture model is given by




Thus, the multilevel regression mixture models is able to capture unobserved heterogeneity at the
individual level, expressed in terms of random intercepts and slopes that vary between clusters,
by modelling the probability of latent classes Ωc.
2.4 The Multilevel Logistic Cluster-Weighted Model
Since finite mixture of regression models are a special case of cluster weighted models, and both
cluster weighted models and multilevel models are very useful in the healthcare context, in this
thesis we extend cluster weighted models to the multilevel framework, and thus we propose an
extension to the finite mixture of regression models described in Section 2.3.
The general formulation of CWM follows that of Section 2.2, and the joint probability of the
random vector of covariates X and the dependent variable Y is expressed as in Equation (2.3).
In this case, the conditional part of the model depends on the distribution of Y , and ξc is the
vector of the regression parameters. The marginal density of the vector of covariates is assumed
to be distributed as a multivariate normal with mean µc and covariance Σc.
In the following we firstly introduce the multilevel CWM for Gaussian dependent variable, as
developed by Berta et al. (2016), and then we define in detail the multilevel CWM (MCWM)
for the cases of Bernoulli distributions of the variable Y conditioned of X , which are the most
adopted in healthcare evaluation, since most health outcomes are dichotomous (e.g. mortality,
readmissions). We further consider the simple case of one covariate only.
Gaussian Multilevel CWM
A multilevel cluster weighted model for a Gaussian dependent variable can be formulated as
follows:
yij = β0c + β1cXcj + uc0j + uc1jXcj + εij , (2.8)
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where uc0j ∼ N(0, τ20c) are the random effects for the hospital j in the cluster c, whereas
uc1j ∼ N(0, τ21c) are the random effects related to the random covariate included in the model,
and εij is the error component.
Logistic Multilevel CWM
Considering the probability π of observing a binary health outcome Y , depending both on the
hierarchical structure in the data (in our case patients within hospitals) and on possible latent
groups, we consider a logit link and a random effect model, resulting in
logit(πjc|X,Ωc) = β0c + β1cXcj + uc0j + uc1jXcj , (2.9)
where the assumptions related to the random effects are the same explained for the Gaussian
case. It is interesting to notice that in healthcare uc0j , the hospital random effects, can be
interpreted as the relative effectiveness of hospitals with respect to the outcome y.
Cluster allocation
Regardless of the distribution of the dependent variable, each patient can be assigned to one of







Typically, the unit is allocated to the cluster associated to the maximum posterior probability.
2.5 Inference for Multilevel Cluster-Weighted Model
2.5.1 The EM-algorithm
In the presence of latent groups, the parameters θ are estimated by an Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm. Using the notation in Equation (2.3), the aim of the estimation process is to
identify the vector of parameters θ composed by
θ = (w1 . . . wC−1, ξ1 . . . ξC ,µ1, . . . ,µC ,Σ1, . . . ,ΣC)
′.









p(yij |xij ; ξc)φ(xij ;µc,Σc)wc}
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where yij and xij are the observed values of Y and X , respectively, for the ith first level ob-
servation (patient) in the jth second level unit (hospital), with j = 1, . . . , J and i = 1, . . . , nj ,
where nj is the total number of patients admitted to the hospital j.
Following McLachlan and Peel (2000), the formulation of the CWM problem can be viewed
as a situation of incomplete data and an EM algorithm can be applied in order to estimate the
maximum likelihood and to identify the probability that the observation (xij , yij) belongs to
one of the identified clusters. Assuming a C-dimensional component-label vector zij where
zijc = 1 if the observation (xij , yij) belongs to the cth cluster and 0 otherwise, the complete
data log-likelihood function for the observation (xij , yij) and the latent allocation zijc can be
expressed as:























Equation (2.10) implies that the complete data log-likelihood is composed of the three parts of
the model: the probability of belonging to one of the clusters, the regression part of the response
given the covariates and the marginal multivariate Gaussian distribution of the covariates.
The EM algorithm follows an iterative process starting with an evaluation of the missing data
based on the available data (E-step) and then a maximization of the expected log-likelihood
(M-step). Considering the unknown vector zij , the (r + 1)th iteration of the EM-algorithm is
based on the expectation with respect to z of the complete data log-likelihood `c((x, y, z)|θ) in
Equation 2.10, with θ estimated at the rth iteration, i.e.
Q(θ,θ(r)) = Ez|(x,y);θ(r)(`c((x, y, z)|θ)).
This requires the calculation of the probability that the observation (xij , yij) belongs to the c
cluster, since
E(zijc|(xij , yij),θ(r)) = Pr{zijc = 1|(xij , yij),θ(r)} = τc((xij , yij),θ(r)).
Given our proposed multilevel CWM,
τc((xij ,yij),θ
(r)) =
p(yij |xij ; ξ(r)c )φ(xij ;µ(r)c ,Σ(r)c )w(r)c∑C




















(r)){log(wc)+log[p(yij |xij , ξc)]+log[φ(xij ;µc,Σc)]}.
At this point the M-Step performs the estimation of the maximum likelihood, obtaining the
new parameters θ for the next iteration of the E-Step. The iterative process continues until
a pre-defined convergence criterion is met. The convergence is guaranteed when the Aitken
acceleration index (Böhning et al. 1994, McLachlan and Peel 2000) is lower than a defined
threshold, which is typically set to 1e-04.
In particular, under the assumption that the algorithm is concluded when at the iteration r the
estimated log-likelihood l(r) is approaching some value l∗, we can observe that
l(r+1) − l∗ ≈ a(l(r) − l∗) (2.11)
for all r, and a included between 0 and 1. Following Böhning et al. (1994), at the (r + 1)th












(l(r+1) − l(r)) (2.13)
as demonstrated developing a geometric series in Böhning et al. (1994). The identification of an
adequate number of clusters is a key issue in model-based clustering. This problem is strictly re-
lated with the model selection, and the EM algorithm is not able to estimate the optimal number
of latent clusters in the data. Conversely, the number of latent groups must be specified as an ini-
tialization parameter of the EM algorithm. In this context Bayesian information criterion (BIC,
Schwarz (1978)) is commonly adopted for choosing the number of latent clusters (McLachlan
and Peel 2000), and the evidence state that penalized log-likelihood criteria, including Akaike’s
information criterion (AIC) and BIC, do not underestimate the optimal number of components
(McLachlan and Rathnayake 2014). A commonly adopted criterion to select the optimal num-
ber of latent clusters requires to restart the estimation process several times initializing the EM
algorithm with an increasing number of components. The optimal number of clusters is usually
defined as the number which provides the lower value of BIC.
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2.5.2 Standard errors via parametric bootstrap
The end of the EM algorithm provides two main results: the allocation of the observations to
one of the identified clusters and the estimates of the parameters for both the fixed and the ran-
dom effects of the regression part. Altough EM estimation process is widely adopted for MLE
in model based-clustering, an assessment of the parameters variability is needed, due to the po-
tential small dimension of the clusters or when the clusters are not well separated (Basford et al.
1997). Furhtermore, when the number of level 2 units is small the asymptotic MLE procedures
may not accurately estimate the uncertainty associated with the parameter estimates from the
EM algorithm (O’Hagan et al. 2015). For these reasons, we include in the estimation process a
further step consisting of a bootstrap process, in order to assess the variability of the EM esti-
mates. In particular, we implement a parametric bootstrap approach for mixed models, adapting
the steps described in Carpenter et al. (2003) to the multilevel cluster weighted models frame-
work. Considering as an example a multilevel random intercept logistic framework, and using
the notation of Equation (2.9), the bootstrap approach follows these steps:
1. We denote by β̂0, β̂1 and τ̂20 the fitted parameters in one of the identified clusters, where
we drop the index c for simplicity;
2. We simulate the vector of the random effects u∗0j ∼ N(0, τ̂20 ), for j = 1, . . . , J ;
3. We simulate the bootstrap data y∗ij from a Bernulli(π
∗
ij) with
π∗j = exp(β̂0 + β̂1Xj + u
∗
0j)/(1 + exp(β̂0 + β̂1Xj + u
∗
0j)),
maintaining the same sample size overall and within group;





5. We repeat the steps 2-4 B times, where B is the number of bootstrap iterations.
2.6 Simulation study
In this section, we present numerical studies based on simulated data, assuming a Bernoulli dis-
tribution for the dependent variable, conditional on one independent variable. We consider 150
units at level 1 (patients) and 20 units at level 2 (hospitals), so the data are in the form:
{(xij , yij) ; i = 1, . . . , 150 and j = 1, . . . , 20}. We simulate n = 3, 000 observations, gener-
ated from the model in Equation (2.9) with C = 3 equally-sized latent classes (w1 = w2 =
w3 = 1/3), so that in this multilevel structure each hospital for each cluster discharge 50 pa-
tients. The covariate X is simulated according to a Gaussian distribution with mean specified
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below, whereas all the variances in the model are set to 1.
The aim of these simulations is to compare our model (MCWM) with the multilevel logistic ran-
dom mixture model (MRMM), which is presented in Section 2.3. All models have been fitted
according to the maximum likelihood approach. The MCWM uses the EM algorithm described
in Section 2.5.1 and coded in R. MRMM has been fitted using the MPlus software (Geiser
2012).
Models are compared on the basis of the estimated parameters, the accuracy of the classification
of the binary dependent variable, and the analysis of the model’s ability in allocating the obser-
vations to the right latent class. The estimation is compared by the mean over the number of
latent clusters of the distance between the parameters fixed for the simulations and the estimated
parameters. This comparison is provided separately for the intercepts β0c and the slopes β1c






where γc are the true parameters and γ̂c are their estimates. In order to analyse the accuracy
of the model in predicting the values of the binary dependent variable, we generated 100 new
datasets using the same parameters setted for the simulated data and then we apply the param-
eters estimated using both MCWM and MRMM for the training data. Adopting a threshold of
0.5 to the predicted probability of each model, we predict the values of the binary dependent
variable. Hence we create the confusion matrix comparing the predicted y with the observed






where diagi are the two values in the diagonal of the confusion matrix. The comparison is pro-
vided by the mean of the 100 replicated tests. We, therefore, test the accuracy of the predictions
using the ROC curve. The ROC curve is a plot comparing the true-positive rate (sensitivity)
with the corresponding false-positive rate (1-specificity), which is helpful in evaluating a classi-
fication model. In our case, the sensitivity is the ability of the model to correctly classify each
observation in the two values of the dependent variable (true positive rate), whereas the speci-
ficity is the ability of the model to correctly identify that the predicted value of an observation
does not match the observed one (true negative rate). Both the sensitivity and specificity are
based on a threshold which is used to define the confusion matrix. If, for example, the thresh-
old equals to 0.5, all the observations with a predicted value grater than 0.5 are assigned to the
value 1, otherwise to 0. In the confusion matrix this allocation is compared with the original
value of the dependent variable. The results of both specificity and sensitivity, calculated for
several thresholds, provide the points needed to define the ROC curve. The comparison between
different models is based on the area under the curve: the higher is the area the better is the
performance of the model (Zou et al. 2011).
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Simluated data from a CWM Random Intercept with large overlapping between clusters
(b) Second Simulation
FIGURE 2.1: Simulations from a random intercept CWM
The last comparison which we provide measures the ability of the models in allocating the ob-
servations. In this sense, we compare the allocation provided by the models with the allocation
defined when we have simulated the data. At the end of the estimation process, we compare the
number of observations allocated to the right cluster with the overall number of observations,
obtaining the percentage of exact allocation.
Finally, in this section, we provide evidence about the performance of the bootstrap method for
building confidence intervals for the parameters.
2.6.1 Comparison of models on data generated from a two-level random intercept
CWM
In this study, we consider two simulations with different level of separation between clusters.
The motivation is that the higher the level of proximity among clusters, the higher the expected
difficulty for the estimation processes in allocating each observation to the right cluster. In
particular, in the first simulation (Figures 2.1a) the observations in the clusters show a low level
of overlapping, with only few observations that can be confused at the time of the allocation
among clusters. In the second simulation (Figure 2.1b) the clusters are more overlapped and
this should affect the ability of both the MRMM and the MCWM to correctly identify the latent
groups and then to estimate the model parameters. Each color in the graph indicates one of the
three simulated clusters. The parameter setting for the two simulations is presented in Table 2.1,
following the same notation as in Equation (2.9) for regression parameters, where µc represents
the mean of the density for the covariateX , depending on theC latent clusters. Because MCWM
models the distribution of X , we expect that it should obtain a better allocation than MRMM,
particularly when the level of overlapping between the clusters increases.
Table 2.2 shows the accuracy of the estimated parameters of the fixed part of the model for
both MRMM and MCWM, using the measures described before. For the first simulation, we
observe that both MRMM and MCWM estimate a set of parameters which is quite similar to
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First simulation Second simulation
Latent classes
c = 1 3 2
β0c c = 2 -1 0.5
c = 3 -3 -2
c = 1 0.3 0.5
β1c c = 2 0.3 0.5
c = 3 0.3 0.5
c = 1 -5 -3
µc c = 2 0 0
c = 3 5 2
TABLE 2.1: Parameters used for data generation in the two simulations from a random
intercept CWM.
Model framework Fist simulation Second simulation
MRMM ∆intercept 1.3250 5.3560
∆slope 0.0001 0.5630
MCWM ∆intercept 0.1273 1.3708
∆slope 0.0001 0.4906
TABLE 2.2: Accuracy of the parameters’ estimates for MRMM and MCWM for the two









TABLE 2.3: Performance comparison for MRMM and MCWM based on classification
accuracy
the parameters used to simulate the data. Conversely, in the second simulation, the MCWM
performs better moreover in terms of model intercept. Table 2.3 shows the comparison in terms
of classification accuracy. Even in this case, the level of overlapping has an impact on the
ability of our model in predicting the dependent variable. Nevertheless, in both simulations
the accuracy of the MCWM is better than that of MRMM. Figure 2.2 shows the ROC curves
for both the simulations. In the first simulation the area under the curve is good for both the
compared model, and we can appreciate that the MCWM obtain a better performance. In the
second simulation we observe a lower performance for both the models which reduce their
ability in terms of both true and false positive rates. Finally, Table 2.5 shows the comparison
in terms of the percentage of exact allocation of the observations into clusters. MRMM and
MCWM perform both well in this first simulation, obtaining a performance close to 100% of
exact allocation. This was an expected result as the clusters are quite separated and both MRMM
and MCWM are able to allocate the units to their right cluster. In the second simulation, instead,
the performance for both the models decreases, but MCWM performs better than MRMM.
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AUC for MCWM: 0.842
AUC for MMRM: 0.769
(a) First Simulation
























AUC for MCWM: 0.701
AUC for MMRM: 0.682
(b) Second Simulation
FIGURE 2.2: ROC Curve comparing the accuracy of predicting the dependent variable in the
two simulations from a random intercept CWM. AUC in the legend represents the Area Under
the Curve.








TABLE 2.5: Performance comparison for MRMM and MCWM based on percentage of exact
allocation to the clusters
2.6.2 Bootstrap coverage
In Section 2.5.2 we described bootstrap procedure to derive the confidence intervals for the
model parameters. Methods to construct confidence intervals are typically evaluated by the
coverage. In our case the procedure described in Section 2.5.2 produces a confidence interval
for each of the model parameters. In a simulation setting we construct 500 datasets from the
same model after fixing the values of the true parameters. For each parameter, the coverage is
defined by the percentage of times that the true parameter falls in the 500 generated confidence
intervals. If the confidence level is set to the 95% one would expect the coverage close to this
nominal value (Carpenter and Bithell 2000).
To verify the coverage, we perform a simulation study on a dataset with a hierarchical structure
and a different number of units at level 1 and level 2 (see Table 2.7 for details). We consider a
binary dependent variable and one covariate distributed as a standard normal. We consider the
case of no clusters and we fix the parameters to β0 = −2, β1 = 2 and τ20 = 4, using the notation
of Equation 2.9. Table 2.7 shows a relatively good performance in terms of coverage for the
bootstrap algorithm, somewhat lower than 95% but in line with (Carpenter and Bithell 2000). In
addition, the table shows that the performance increases with the number of observations
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Parameters Coverages (%) for the different sample sizes
40 level 2, 20 level 1 80 level 2, 40 level 1 160 level 2, 80 level 1
β0 87.00% 89.10% 90.30%
β1 90.00% 91.20% 91.80%
τ2u 87.30% 88.20% 89.10%
TABLE 2.7: Coverage of the parametric bootstrap approach for 95% confidence intervals from
simulated data with varying sample sizes.
2.7 Mortality evaluation by a MCWM approach based on binary
dependent variable
In this section we provide an application of the MCWM to real data in order to demonstrate its
suitability for the evaluation in healthcare, and its ability in disentangle latent heterogeneity in
the data. For this application we consider the Lombardy case-study described in Chapter 1, and
we evaluate the hospital performance in terms of mortality, the most adopted healthcare out-
come. We complete the outcome evaluation by providing the hospitals’ league tables (Goldstein
and Spiegelhalter 1996). In this way, we demonstrate that MCWM can be an optimal tool for
policy makers interested in outcome evaluation. The outcome of interest is 30-day mortality,
the most used proxy of quality in this research field. This outcome is measured by merging the
hospitalization records with the registry of citizens conserved in Lombardy, where we can find
the date of death for each patient. In this way we can identify whether a patient discharged alive
has died within 30 day after the discharge.
Data concerning hospitalizations occurred in 2014 in 127 hospitals in Lombardy, provide in-
formation on a number of selected patients’ characteristics, namely sex, age, the DRG weight,
measuring the resources used by the hospital to treat each patient, and the Elixhauser index
(Elixhauser et al. 1998), measuring the level of patients’ comorbidities. Both the DRG weight
and the Elixauser index are here considered as a proxy of patients’ severity.
We analyse the MCWM on two different disciplines: cardiosurgery and medicine. Cardio-
surgery is a highly specialized discipline admitting patients that need complex surgical interven-
tion, but with a low risk of mortality, whereas medicine is a widespread general discipline,
characterized by a high risk of mortality. We exploit the hierarchical structure of patients
nested within hospitals using a multilevel model and we use the proposed MCWM to inves-
tigate whether there is evidence for further latent structures. We consider for simplicity models
with two clusters. The descriptive statistics in Table 2.8 allow us to appreciate the different case-
mix of patients admitted in the two considered wards and in the two identified clusters. Patients
in cardiosurgery are on average younger than patients in medicine, while the risk of mortality
in medicine is 10 times higher compared to cardiosurgery. The value of the DRG weight shows
how cardiosurgery is a highly specialized discipline. The clustering composition for cardio-
surgery indicates how the two latent groups mainly differ according to the age (in cluster 2 the
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patients are younger). Considering the clusters identified in medicine, we observe that patients
in cluster 2 are younger than patients in cluster 1, which leads to a lower risk of mortality for
this cluster compared to cluster 1. Moreover, higher levels of comorbidities are observed for the
patients allocated to cluster 1.
We compare the results of the evaluation performed using MCWM with a typical evaluation
DRG Weight Comorbidity Age Female Mortality
Cardiosurgery
Cluster 1 Mean 5.4110 1.2235 70.5777 0.3305 0.0140
Std Dev 2.8120 1.0693 8.4312 0.4704 0.1175
Num of Obs 7,788 7,788 7,788 7,788 7,788
Cluster 2 Mean 5.5688 1.0551 42.6457 0.3363 0.0067
Std Dev 3.3237 0.8868 8.4884 0.4727 0.0819
Num of Obs 889 889 889 889 889
Medicine
Cluster 1 Mean 1.0922 1.3463 79.0967 0.5179 0.1660
Std Dev 0.7092 1.1230 9.1036 0.4997 0.3721
Num of Obs 119,678 119,678 119,678 119,678 119,678
Cluster 2 Mean 0.9399 0.8611 44.0957 0.4851 0.0605
Std Dev 0.5520 0.9337 10.3680 0.4998 0.2385
Num of Obs 18,407 18,407 18,407 18,407 18,407
TABLE 2.8: Descriptive statistics of the two clusters identified by MCWM on the two
separated wards of cardiosurgery and medicine.
based on multilevel model. This comparison is performed in terms of goodness of fit and param-
eters estimates of both the fixed and random effects.The goodness of fit is evaluated according to
the BIC. Table 2.9 shows how the multilevel cluster-weighted model has a lower BIC compared
to the classical multilevel model. Looking further at the parameter estimates, Table 2.9 shows
how several effects of the covariates on the risk of mortality are different between the two latent
groups, both in terms of magnitude and of direction of the relationship, and how these differ-
ences are not picked up by the standard multilevel model. The significance of the estimates is
evaluated via the parametric bootstrap approach described before. For cardiosurgery, our pro-
posed model finds a different direction and significance for the effect of age and DRG weight
on mortality among the two clusters. Whereas in the standard multilevel model the coefficient
related to the DRG weight is negative and not significant, the application of the MCWM shows
how this relationship is negative and significant for the patients allocated in cluster 1, indicating
that the higher the resources used by the hospital to treat patients in this group the lower their
risk of mortality, while the relationship is positive and significant for the patients allocated in
cluster 2, demonstrating that for these patients a higher severity implies a higher risk of death.
Moreover, we observe that cluster 2 is characterized by a higher magnitude of coefficients re-
lated to sex and DRG weight and the estimated coefficient for comorbidities is slightly higher
for cluster 1 compared to that of cluster 2. In contrast to this, in the ward of medicine, we do not
observe any differences in the direction of coefficients in the compared models, but using the
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MCWM we detect a different magnitude for the coefficients related to comorbidities, age and
DRG weight. In particular in cluster 2 the effect of age and comorbidities is more than double
compared to the coefficients in cluster 1. Therefore, in medicine we observe a gender effect in
cluster 1, with female patients having a lower risk of morality in that cluster.
The effects detected in Table 2.9 have a significant impact on the final league tables, and show
Cardiosurgery Estimates Multilevel MCWM
Cluster1 Cluster2
(Intercept) -8.3233*** -8.8560*** -10.2914***
Female 0.1786 0.2278 0.6188
Age 0.0517*** 0.0601*** -0.0032
DRG Weigth -0.0038 -0.0849 0.4145***
Comorbidity 0.2485*** 0.3142*** 0.1834
BIC -58295.35 -59399.93
Medicine
(Intercept) -5.7630*** -6.9378*** -12.0587***
Female -0.2683*** -0.3280*** -0.0745
Age 0.0491*** 0.0613*** 0.1541***
DRG Weigth 0.3679*** 0.3773*** 0.5489***
Comorbidity 0.0677*** 0.0328*** 0.7610***
BIC -1128332 -1167850
TABLE 2.9: Regression coefficients of the multilevel and the MCWM models fitted to the
Lombardy healthcare data for the cases of cardiosurgery and medicine.
also here a difference between the results obtained by the proposed MCWM model and by a stan-
dard multilevel approach. Figure 2.3 shows the league tables for cardiosurgery for the MCWM
(top) and multilevel (bottom) approaches. Figure 2.4 provides the same results for medicine.
These figures are drawn based on the estimated random effects and on confidence intervals ob-
tained using the same parametric bootstrap approach described before. This is implemented, for
each cluster, in the function plotREsim in the R package merTools (Knowles and Freder-
ick 2016). Hospital random effects different from the overall average (i.e. when the confidence
interval does not cross the red line) are highlighted in bold. The figures show how, in cardio-
surgery, the league tables of the multilevel model and of cluster 1 of MCWM are the same, but
MCWM allows to detect a bad performance related to the hospital coded as 7 in cluster 2 . This
is the only hospital presenting a bad performance in this cluster, and it is the only hospital with
bad results both in cluster 1 and cluster 2. This means that the patients allocated in cluster 2
receive the same quality in all the hospitals except for hospital 7.
In medicine, a direct comparison of the league tables is complicated by the large number of
hospitals involved in this analysis. However, we are able to compare the overall heterogeneity
of Figure 2.4c with the cluster specific heterogeneity in Figure 2.4a and Figure 2.4b. As we
observed for cardiosurgery, patients allocated in cluster 2 receive a more homogeneous quality,





















































(c) League Table for Multilevel Model
FIGURE 2.3: League Tables for the MCWM (top) and Multilevel Model (bottom) in
Cardiosurgery
and this could be a useful cluster for policy makers to identify the hospitals that have a bad
performance for a specific analysis.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented an extension of cluster-weighted models for hierarchical data and a
binary dependent variable. The extension of the multilevel cluster-weighted models to the case
of Bernoulli dependent variable, is particularly interesting in healthcare context, where often
binary outcomes are considered. The proposed model allows to identify latent clusters in the
data, related to both the outcome and the risk-adjustment variables, as well as to account for
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(c) League Table for Multilevel Model
FIGURE 2.4: League Tables for the MCWM (top) and Multilevel Model (bottom) in Medicine
the hierarchical structure of the data which is typical in healthcare evaluations. We presented
inference of the model, including an EM-algorithm for parameter estimation and a parametric
bootstrap approach for building confidence intervals for the parameters.
Numerical studies compared the performance of the MCWM with the performance of the mix-
ture of multilevel logistic models. The results showed that the MCWM achieves better (or at
least not worse) results than the MRMM.
An empirical application is provided, using a rich dataset gathered from the Lombardy health-
care system. The application confirmed that the proposed MCWM detects two well-defined
latent groups within the hierarchical structure of hospitals. Interestingly, the regression coeffi-
cients have different signs, magnitude and statistical significance for the two different groups,
showing the advantage of this method compared to a standard multilevel model. The Bayesian
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information criterion supported this comparison. In addition to the fixed effects, the league ta-
bles of hospitals constructed from the random effects showed different patterns between the two
latent groups.
Although the application shown here is mostly illustrative of the method, it may stimulate fur-
ther investigations of the determinants of latent class membership in a similar context. Such
investigations may focus on the patients’ severity based on unobserved characteristics, and also
considering different clinical disciplines or illnesses, such as AMI. Furthermore, this new model
framework opens a new way in the healthcare evaluation, in particular it can help in handling
with the issue underlined by Lilford et al. (2004), which specified that an overall evaluation
does not consider latent patients characteristics, neither observable nor measured characteristics
. The adoption of MCWM can reduce this issue providing new evidence in the effectiveness
evaluation process.
In general, the adoption of the MCWM may have great implications for policy makers and
healthcare managers. Indeed, the use of MCWM highlighted the effects that could be masked
using a classical multilevel approach, and how these could impact the final rankings of hospi-
tals. This is clearly expressed in the application where the league tables provided by MCWM
make clear the quality provided in each cluster and how the quality by a hospital can be different
focusing on different clusters.
However, the proposed model can be widely applied in all research fields where there is a binary
outcome and a hierarchical structure of the data. For example, education is a typical field of
research where data are characterized by a hierarchical structure and binary outcomes are often
considered.
Chapter 3
Policy evaluation using a
Difference-in-Difference approach
In this chapter, we evaluate the effectiveness of a pay-for-performance program on the basis of
five health outcomes and across a wide range of medical conditions. In Lombardy a reward-
ing program was introduced in 2012, and we aim to evaluate this policy using a difference-in-
differences approach. The model includes multiple dependent outcomes, that allow quantifying
the joint effect of the program, and random effects, that account for the heterogeneity of the
data at the ward and hospital level. Our results show that the policy had a positive effect on the
hospitals’ performance in terms of those outcomes that can be more influenced by a managerial
activity, namely the number of readmissions, transfers and returns to surgery room.
3.1 Literature review on P4P programs
As anticipated in Chapter 1, the adoption of a Pay-for-Performance (P4P) approach aims to
drive the hospitals in improving quality. The idea behind the implementation of a P4P ap-
proach is quite simple: in order to improve the overall quality delivered, healthcare providers
are given the opportunity to have their reimbursements increased when they achieve specified
quality benchmarks (Alshamsan et al. 2010, Eijkenaar et al. 2013). From an economics perspec-
tive, the hospital is considered as a profit maximizer agent which is encouraged to compete for
quality in order to obtain a financial reward, rather than to attract more patients. Therefore, a
P4P program is considered efficient when an improved quality of care is achieved with equal or
lower costs (Emmert et al. 2012), and, clearly, the evaluation of the quality delivered is a crucial
part to every P4P approach.
The aim of the current chapter is to contribute to the existing literature by providing a thorough
evaluation of a P4P program and its effect on the overall quality of the healthcare system. As in
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the evaluation of any policy, a choice needs to be made about which health outcome to use for
quantifying the impact of the P4P program. In many studies, a single outcome is considered. For
example, Sutton et al. (2012) quantify the impact of the P4P adoption in England by analysing
the hospital overall mortality. In addition, the evaluation of P4P programmes is often confined
to specific clinical conditions, such as acute myocardial infarction (AMI), coronary artery by-
pass graft surgery (CABG), heart failure, pneumonia, and hip/knee replacement (Glickman et al.
2007, Jha et al. 2012, Levin-Scherz et al. 2006, Shih et al. 2014, Sutton et al. 2012). In contrast
to these studies, we analyse the P4P effect using five different health outcomes and based on the
overall case-mix hospitalizations of the wards considered. Moreover, for the first time in a P4P
study, we investigate the policy effect with regards to hospital ownership, by evaluating possible
different reactions to the P4P program among the private (for-profit and not-for-profit) and pub-
lic providers, and also with regards to the different wards, by evaluating whether surgical and
medical wards reacted differently to the policy.
The chapter proceeds as follows: in Section 3.2 we describe the healthcare system in Lombardy
and the adopted P4P program; in Section 3.4 we describe the chosen methodological approach;
in Section 3.3 we present the data used in the analysis and in Section 3.5 we discuss the results
of the policy evaluation. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 The P4P program in Lombardy
The definition of the healthcare system in Italy and, in specific, in Lombardy, has been discussed
in Chapter 1. Here, we describe how Lombardy introduced in 2012 a new reform which included
a P4P program, whereby the increment of the hospital annual budget, based on a weighted mean
of the hospital’s evaluated outcomes.The hospitals are ranked according to this measure: the
first hospital in the ranking receives an increment of 2% of its annual budget, the worst one gets
a penalty of 2%, whereas all the others receive an amount between the interval [−2%,+2%],
and proportional to the distance between their score and the score of the last hospital in the cat-
egory’s ranking (p.84 of Region (2011), Region (2012)).
In the first instance, the regional healthcare management decided to evaluate the weighted out-
come measures only on 9 wards, i.e. cardiology, cardiosurgery, neurosurgery, neurology, on-
cology, general medicine, urology, orthopaedic, surgery. The wards were chosen according to
the coverage within the hospitals, the inclusion of both medical and surgical disciplines as well
as the level of specialization (cardiosurgery and neurosurgery). Further details on the policy
introduction can be found in the regional resolution (Region (2011)).
Following these premises, the study discussed in this chapter, in line with the designs adopted
by previous studies (Lindenauer et al. 2007, Rosenthal et al. 2005), analyses 9 hospital wards
covering a wide range of medical conditions, exogenously selected for the treatment group, and
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subjected to the P4P program, whereas the other hospital wards were not involved in the pro-
gram, and they are considered for the control group. Data were collected both two years prior
and two year post introduction of the policy for all hospitals in the Lombardy region. The aim
of this chapter is then to evaluate the effect of the policy on the basis of the data collected.
It is interesting to note that the incentive is provided to the hospital as a whole, as typical of P4P
programmes in healthcare (Cashin et al. 2014). The individual hospitals have then a large ac-
countability on how the allocate the incentive payments. Typically, provider institutions allocate
the financial resources to make general improvements in the service delivered, and in particular
related to the performance measures. In the case of the Lombardy region, it is also possible that
the physicians and/or nurses working in the treated wards received a direct bonus as a drive to
performance improvement. This is however bound to vary across hospitals, so we do not expect
to see the impact of this in our policy evaluation.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
In this section, we give the specific of the data used for the policy evaluation.
The database was gathered from the Lombardy healthcare information system. Data were col-
lected on patients admitted to 142 hospitals during the four years 2010-2013 (two before and
two in the policy-on period). In this period the hospitals provided 3,581,389 hospitalisations,
coded in the available hospital discharge chart. In our analysis, we included patients admitted
for acute care and we excluded patients living outside the region, patients younger than two
years old or patients hospitalized in day-hospital, rehabilitation or palliative treatments.
Table 3.1 provides details for the variables considered in the study and the five outcomes. We
used variables both at the patient and ward/hospital level. At the patient level, there is infor-
mation on their gender, age, number of transit to the intensive care unit during hospitalization,
the weight of the financial reimbursement corresponding to the patient’s disease, and the comor-
bidity index. The latter is measured as in Elixhauser et al. (1998) and indicates the presence
of one or more additional diseases or disorders co-occurring with a primary disease or disor-
der. At the hospital level, we know whether the hospital is affiliated to a medical school in
which medical students receive practical training, whether the hospital is mono-specialistic or
general, and whether there is presence of high-technology instrumentation in the ward. Finally,
we include the hospitals’ ownership, which categorizes the hospital as private for profit, private
not-for-profit or public, and we distinguish wards whose prevalent activity is surgical from the
medical ones. The effectiveness of the policy is evaluated over the five health outcomes, namely
mortality, readmissions, transfers, returns, and voluntary discharges. We should clarify that the
outcome return to the surgery room can be evaluated only for the surgical wards.
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Untreated Treated
Pre-policy Post-policy Pre-policy Post-policy
2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013
Patient
MALE 0.2589 0.2613 0.2646 0.2673 0.5399 0.5413 0.5397 0.5383
(0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
AGE 46.076 46.585 46.973 47.212 64.526 64.877 65.054 65.384
(21.1) (21.1) (21.2) (21.3) (18.7) (18.5) (18.6) (18.5)
DRGWEIGHT 0.892 0.9127 0.9139 0.919 1.2974 1.3252 1.3167 1.3277
(0.81) (0.84) (0.83) (0.85) (1.12) (1.15) (1.12) (1.13)
COMORBIDITY 0.2379 0.2128 0.2156 0.2099 0.4082 0.3303 0.325 0.3121
(0.58) (0.55) (0.56) (0.55) (0.72) (0.66) (0.65) (0.64)
INTCARE 0.015 0.0164 0.017 0.0174 0.0644 0.0676 0.0677 0.0687
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Ward/Hospital
TECHNOLOGY 0.8585 0.8588 0.8614 0.8683 0.8079 0.807 0.8111 0.8119
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
TEACHING 0.2684 0.2708 0.2754 0.2734 0.2455 0.2456 0.2471 0.2456
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
SPECIALISED 0.052 0.0474 0.0482 0.049 0.0387 0.0386 0.0406 0.0393
(0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
SURGICAL 0.5637 0.5535 0.5646 0.562 0.5088 0.4884 0.4942 0.487
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.5)) (0.49)
OWN:NOPROFIT 0.0758 0.0765 0.077 0.0793 0.0947 0.0948 0.0975 0.096
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
OWN:PROFIT 0.1376 0.1373 0.1346 0.1264 0.2314 0.2354 0.2308 0.2327
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
OWN:PUBLIC 0.7866 0.7862 0.7884 0.7943 0.6739 0.6698 0.6717 0.6713
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.5)) (0.49)
Outcomes
TRANSFERS 0.0056 0.0052 0.0036 0.0035 0.0127 0.0127 0.0053 0.0051
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07)
RETURN 0.0592 0.0632 0.0099 0.0108 0.0431 0.0443 0.0154 0.0161
(0.23) (0.24) (0.09) (0.10) (0.20) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12)
MORTALITY 0.0268 0.0276 0.029 0.0273 0.0593 0.0608 0.0611 0.0601
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
READMISSIONS 0.1216 0.1149 0.1117 0.1091 0.1335 0.1277 0.1211 0.1111
(0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.31)
VOLDISCH 0.0084 0.0085 0.0082 0.0084 0.0088 0.0081 0.0076 0.007
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
TABLE 3.1: Sample means and standard deviations in brackets for the covariates in the study
from the Lombardy hospital inpatient stays for each year before and after the policy
introduction.
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Table 3.1 reports the average (and the standard deviations in brackets) of the variables in the
dataset by treatment and across the four years of the study (two pre and two post policy). It
appears that the mix of patients within the treated and untreated wards is relatively stable over
time, but that there are differences between the two groups. In particular, patients that are ad-
mitted to the treated wards are on average older than those admitted to the untreated ward. In
addition, the treated wards consider higher risk patients than the untreated wards in terms of
DRGs weight, number of comorbidities and intensive treatment. The percentage of comorbidi-
ties (roughly 30%) is however still relatively small compared to other countries e.g. 0.69% in
Northern Ireland in 2011/2012 (Reilly et al. 2015). This is justified by the coding rules that
affect the healthcare system in Lombardy, whereby only the comorbidities directly connected
with the treated DRGs are registered. Considering the variables related to the hospitals and
the wards, we observe that the overall composition of the hospitals has not changed during the
policy period, with surgical wards covering around 51% of the overall admissions. Moreover,
71% of the hospitalizations are provided by the public hospitals, whereas 30% of the patients
are admitted to a private provider (20% in the for profit hospitals and 9% in the not-for-profit).
With regards to the health outcome measures, three out of the five outcomes, namely transfers,
return to the surgery room and readmissions, show a reduction after the introduction of the P4P
program. The aim is to assess the significance of this finding after adjusting for the patient-level
covariates identified in Table 3.1.
3.4 The Econometric Approach
We test the effect of the policy using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach (Abadie 2005,
Blundell et al. 2004), using the data described in Section 3.3. To justify the suitability of this
approach, the following considerations are needed:
1. The wards are split into a treatment group - the 9 wards that are used for the hospital
evaluation - and a control group - the remaining wards. The allocation of the wards in
one of these groups was made exogenously prior to the introduction of the policy (Region
(2011)). There is an underlying assumption here that, although the incentive is provided
to the hospital as a whole, the incentive is dictated only by the performance of the wards
treated. Combined with the fact that the individual wards operate autonomously, the
untreated wards can be considered as an independent group. A similar analysis was con-
ducted by Sutton et al. (2012), where the treatment and control groups are defined within
each hospital on the basis of selected diagnoses.
2. Units do not switch between the control and the treatment group: improvements in per-
formance of the control group do not affect the financial incentives gained by the hospital.
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We will however test whether there is evidence of a distortion of the hospital behaviour
aimed at inflating the performance evaluation, such as the lift of resources in favour of the
treated wards.
3. Any macro changes affect both groups equally and differences between the treatment and
the control group remain constant in the absence of treatment, i.e. a parallel trend prior
to treatment. The check of this assumption is going to be discussed later in the results
section. Of notice is also the fact that the regional resolution was formally announced in
December 2011 (Region (2011)), and applied from early January 2012 (Region (2012)).
Thus, hospitals had no possibility to anticipate changes.
As discussed in Section 3.3, this policy evaluation is based on five health outcomes. Given the
mix of patients in the different wards, the outcomes are first adjusted by patients characteristics
via the use of a multilevel logistic mixed effect model (Goldstein 2010, Snijders and Bosker
2012). This model allows to account for the hierarchical structure of the data whereby patients
are clustered into wards and wards are nested into hospitals. In addition, the longitudinal struc-
ture of the data means that a time effect is also to be expected. Following the notation introduced
in Section 1.4, let Yiwjt represent a binary health outcome for patient i (with i = 1, . . . , nwjt) in
the wardw (withw = 1, . . . ,Wjt), belonging to the hospital j (with j = 1, . . . , Jt), hospitalized
at time t (in years, t = 2010, . . . , 2013). Let πiwjt be the conditional probability of Yiwjt being






= α+ ηXiwjt + µwjt + ujt, (3.1)
where η is a vector of coefficients for the Xiwjt patient-level covariates, µwjt is a random
effect of the ward w nested within hospital j at time t, capturing the latent heterogeneity of
the wards, whereas ujt captures the latent heterogeneity of the hospital j at time t. µwjt and
ujt are independent and identically distributed, N(0, τ2µ) and N(0, τ
2
u), respectively, and are
assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors. Compared to the model described in Section
1.4 a time effect t and a ward effect w are included.
The model in equation 3.1 returns the patients’ predicted probabilities
π̂iwjt =
exp (α̂+ η̂ Xiwjt + µ̂wjt + ûjt)
1 + exp (α̂+ η̂ Xiwjt + µ̂wjt + ûjt)
, (3.2)







where Pwjtm is the set of patients admitted in the ward w of the hospital j in the month m
(m = 1, . . . , 12) of the year t and |Pwjtm | is the cardinality of this set.
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The aim is now to quantify the policy effect on the basis of the five (adjusted) health outcomes.
As we anticipate a correlation between the five health outcomes, we consider a multivariate
DID model, rather than a separate model for each outcome. Adopting a multivariate model is
not common in healthcare literature, but in this way, we are able to quantify the overall effect
of the policy across all health outcomes, as well as at the individual level. Let then HO(ν)whtm
denote the health outcome ν, namely readmissions (ν = 1), mortality (ν = 2), return to the
surgical room (ν = 3), transfers (ν = 4) and voluntary discharges (ν = 5), at month m of year t
(t = 2010, . . . , 2013) of ward w (w = 1, . . . ,Wj) belonging to hospital j (with j = 1, . . . , J).








h I(h = t) +∑2013
h=2011 δ
(ν)
h (I(h = t) · TREATEDwj) + υ




where the dummy variable TREATEDwj indicates whether the ward w is in the treatment group
or not, the indicator variable I(h = t) indexes the four years of the study (two pre and two
post policy), with 2010 set as reference category, MONTH is a continuous variable, taking
values 1 to 48 and added to correct for a possible seasonality effect, α(ν)j is the random hospital
effect for outcome ν, and the error ε(ν)wjtm = (ε
(1)
wjtm
, . . . , ε
(5)
wjtm
) has a multivariate distribution
εwjtm ∼ N5(0,Σ), with the covariance Σ accounting for possible dependencies between the
different outcomes. The parameter δ(ν)j is of interest in this model. Under the assumption of a
parallel trend pre-policy, we expect δ(ν)2011 = 0 for all outcomes, whereas the parameters δ
(ν)
2012
and δ(ν)2013 represent the DID of average outcomes between the treated and control wards from
the pre to the post-policy years. The two different parameters for the post-policy period let us
detect whether the impact of the policy was immediate in the first year of its introduction or
whether it was delayed in the second year (Ayyagari and Shane 2015). This model allows us to
detect the effect of the policy across all wards.
A second objective of the study is to detect whether the reaction to the P4P adoption is different
depending on the ward’s type. In particular, we group all wards into two types: surgical and
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with the variable SURGICAL defined as 1 if the prevalent activity of the ward is surgical and
0 otherwise. In this model, the DID parameters ψ(ν)hk , j = (2012, 2013), are of interest as they
represent the differences in average outcomes between the surgical treated wards and the surgi-
cal control wards, from the pre to the post policy period and with respect to the medical wards
which are taken as the reference category. For this model, we do not consider the health outcome
returns to the surgery room as this is observed only for the surgical wards.
Finally, in the results section, we also consider a similar model for the detection of possible
differences in the reaction to the P4P adoption depending on the type of hospital ownership.
In particular, we compare private for-profit, private not-for-profit and public hospitals. Due to
the more strict budget constrains for private hospitals, these hospitals may react more actively
to the policy than public ones. Furthermore, private for-profit hospitals are more oriented to-
wards profit than the other hospitals and may therefore be more driven to increase their outcome
measures in order to obtain a financial reward.
3.5 Results of the policy evaluation
In order to assess whether there has been an improvement in the healthcare quality following
the introduction of the P4P policy, we use the multivariate DID approach discussed in Section
3.3. Table 3.2 reports the fixed effects estimates of the model in equation 3.4. As all outcomes
are constrained to be between 0 and 1, the parameter estimates and the p-values are computed
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MORTALITY READMISSIONS RETURN TRANSFERS VOL. DISCH.
MONTHS 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TREATED 0.02*** 0.004*** -0.037*** 0.006*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
YEAR2010 0.044*** 0.13*** 0.084*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
YEAR2011 0.044*** 0.125*** 0.082*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
YEAR2012 0.045*** 0.122*** 0.021*** 0.006* 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
YEAR2013 0.041*** 0.118*** 0.022*** 0.005 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
TREATED·YEAR2011 (δ2011) 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
TREATED·YEAR2012 (δ2012) 0.001 -0.005*** 0.026*** -0.005*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
TREATED·YEAR2013 (δ2013) 0.005*** -0.011*** 0.025*** -0.005*** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001]
The coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) are reported. *** represents significance at the 1% level, ** represents
significance at the 5% level and * represents significance at the 10% level.
TABLE 3.2: Estimates for the fixed effects for the model in equation (3.4).
by a non-parametric bootstrap approach. For this, we use a method specifically developed for
multilevel modelling (Carpenter et al. 2003), and which has been described in Section 2.5.2.
3.5.1 Testing the assumptions of a DID approach for policy evaluation
Table 3.2 shows how the parameters δν2011 of the interaction between TREATED and YEAR2011
are not significantly different from zero. This provides evidence in favour of the parallel trend
assumption for each individual health outcome, i.e. the differences between the average out-
come of the treatment and control group are constant prior to the introduction of the policy. This
assumption is needed in order to evaluate the impact of the policy using a DID approach. As we
require a parallel trend to be satisfied for all health outcomes simultaneously, we use a multivari-
ate analysis of variance test (MANOVA) to test the null hypothesis H0 : δ
(1)
2011 = . . . δ
(5)
2011 = 0
under the model in equation 3.4. The Wilks’ lambda statistics returns a p-value of 0.2676, which
provides further evidence in support of the parallel trend assumption across all health outcomes.
Given that the incentive is provided to the hospital as a whole, it is also necessary to test whether
the introduction of the P4P may have had a negative spillover effect between the treated and the
untreated wards. This would violate the assumption of independence between the two groups
and thus bias the policy evaluation. Although within each ward the physicians and nurses detain
managerial freedom on whether and how to treat the patients, spillover effects could take the
form of hospitals lifting resources in favour of the treated wards to the expense of the untreated
wards. To this aim, we assess whether there has been a difference in the total number of hours
worked by physicians and nurses within each hospital between the treated and the untreated
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wards from the year 2011 (pre-policy) to 2012 (post-policy). We consider 58 hospitals which
have a balanced proportion of treated/untreated wards. Figure 3.1 shows the box-plot of the
number of hours worked by hospital and year. The figure shows how, within each hospital, the
number of hours worked is stable across the two groups and between the pre and post-policy
period, suggesting that no shift of resources occurred, at least at the level of labour. This is
supported by a non-significant p-value for the year-treatment interaction term (0.812) from a
negative binomial generalised linear model which includes also fixed effects for hospitals. In
addition to the allocation of resources, another possible spillover effect could result from the
sharing of technological resources between the different wards. This may have an impact on
surgical outcomes, such as the return to the surgery room in our case. We have no data to eval-
uate this, but we will take this into consideration when interpreting the results of the policy
evaluation analysis.
Together with the spillover effects mentioned above between wards within the same hospital,
the different providers may have also reacted to the policy by avoiding to treat high risk patients
(Levaggi and Montefiori 2013). In order to check for this potential distortion, we have analysed
whether the cream skimming index, calculated as in Berta et al. (2010), changed significantly
between the pre and the post policy period. As above, we restrict the analysis to the hospi-
tals which have a balanced proportion of treated/untreated wards and we perform the pre-post
analysis separately for the treated and untreated groups. Using a multiple regression model, we
find only four hospitals (out of 58) with a significant negative interaction with the post-policy
term, two for the treated wards (p-values: 4.54E−08, 0.0025) and two for the untreated ones
(p-values: 0.02, 0.0314). Thus, we conclude that overall the hospitals show no evidence of a
gaming behaviour in selecting the mix of patients in the post-policy period.
3.5.2 Do the hospitals react positively to the policy?
We are now in a position to evaluate the impact of the P4P policy by considering the estimates
of the coefficients of the interaction between the treatment variable and the post-policy years
in Table 3.2, i.e. δν2012 and δ
ν
2013. As all health outcomes are improved if they are reduced, a
significant and negative coefficient for these interactions would mean that the P4P introduction
had a positive effect on quality. This result is confirmed for readmissions (δ2012 = −0.0051,
δ2013 = −0.0112) and transfers (δ2012 = −0.0046, δ2013 = −0.0047). This is a clear signal
that the hospital activity was modified as a result of the P4P introduction, as both readmissions
and transfers are directly affected by the hospital organization. In particular, the results show
that the P4P program may have reduced the hospital attitude of readmitting patients in order to
increase the number of the DRGs provided (Berta et al. 2010). The reduction in the transfers of
the patients between hospitals in the treated wards is also particularly encouraging, considering
that transfers are directly linked to the patient safety and continuity of care.
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FIGURE 3.1: Box-plot of the number of hours worked by hospital and year for the Treated
(top) and Untreated (bottom) wards.
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In order to further quantify the impact of the policy and to confirm the significance of the results
on the health outcomes in absolute terms, Figure 3.2 plots the marginal effects of each health
outcome in equation 3.4 for treated and untreated wards and over the observation period (Ai
and Norton 2003, Karaca-Mandic et al. 2012). As well as verifying the parallel trend in the
pre-policy period, the plots show a clear improvement for readmissions and transfers. In partic-
ular, there is an absolute difference of 0.91% and 1.52% in the average number of readmissions
between the treated and untreated wards in the year 2012 and 2013, respectively, and of 0.31%
in the year 2011, whereas there is a difference of 0.19% and 0.18% in the average number of
transfers between the treated and untreated wards in the year 2012 and 2013, respectively, and
of 0.72% in the year 2011. This leads to DID reductions of 0.60% (readmissions) and 0.53%
(transfers) in 2012 compared to 2011 and a further reduction of 0.61% (readmissions) and 0.01%
(transfers) in 2013. The predicted percentages of reduction correspond to a P4P-related saving
of 4,324 readmissions and 4,295 transfers in the treated wards in 2012 and a further reduction of
4,871 readmissions and 157 transfers in 2013. The picture for the other three health outcomes is
more complex than for transfers and readmissions. The average number of returns to the surgery
room seems to increase in the treated wards more than in the untreated after the introduction of
the policy, as δ2012 and δ2013 are positive and significant. This is shown in Figure 3.2, which,
on the other hand, shows also how the P4P incentives improve the performance for both the
treated and untreated wards. This is an interesting result, suggesting that the managerial impact
in the hospital organization caused by the adoption of the P4P program has changed the overall
hospital performance with regards to the surgical activity. A possible explanation to this could
be given by a spillover effect between the treated and the untreated wards, as all wards may be
benefiting from potentially improved technology in the surgery room.
For the other two health outcomes, voluntary discharges and mortality, the coefficients of δ2012
and δ2013 are not significantly different from zero. Figure 3.2 shows how the number of volun-
tary discharges decreases already before the P4P introduction. With regards to mortality, it is
reasonable to believe that, when hospitals are checked for effectiveness on more than one output,
they will focus on those outcomes that are easily measurable. This is observed by Propper et al.
(2008) in the context of a competition analysis. From this point of view, readmissions, transfers
and return to the surgery room represent well-measured outcomes. Hence it is possible that
hospitals have focussed their efforts on those easily measured and better observable activities in
order to increase their performance and then gain financial rewards.
3.5.3 Do surgical and medical wards react differently to the policy?
We fit the model in equation 3.5 to the data in order to answer this question. The results,
omitted in full for brevity, show evidence of a differential impact of the P4P introduction for
the two health outcomes that were significant in the global analysis above. In particular, there is
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(a) Expected Mortality (b) Expected Readmissions
(c) Expected Returns to OR (d) Expected Transfers
(e) Expected Voluntary Discharges
FIGURE 3.2: Marginal effects of all health outcomes per year and treatment for the model in
equation 3.4.
evidence that the P4P program impacted more on the medical wards than on the surgical ones in
terms of number of readmissions (ψ2012 = 0.008, p-value = 0.0102; ψ2013 = 0.0307, p-value
=< .0001) and number of transfers (ψ2012 = 0.0117, p-value = 0.0002, ψ2013 = 0.012, p-
value = 0.0001). This is shown visually also by the marginal effects in Figure 3.3. This finding
can be explained by the fact that the surgical healthcare pathways are more rigorous and more
linked to fixed guidelines than those on medical hospitalizations, which instead tend to be more
flexible and more dependent on managerial actions and hospital organization.
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(a) Expected Readmissions (b) Expected Transfers
FIGURE 3.3: Marginal effects of readmissions and transfers per type of ward, year and
treatment for the model in equation 3.5.
3.5.4 Do private and public hospitals react differently to the policy?
Previous studies have found no dependency between hospital ownership and efficiency (Bar-
betta et al. 2007) or hospital ownership and competition (Berta et al. 2016), suggesting that the
long term adoption of a quasi-market system in Lombardy has reduced the expected differences
between the hospital types.
In this section, we test whether the hospitals reacted differently to the introduction of the P4P
policy, depending on their ownership. In order to answer this question, we use a model like
equation 3.5, but with SURGICAL replaced by a variable representing the ownership type
(OWN), where public is taken as the reference category. Once again, the interactions ψ(ν)jk
are of interest in this model. In line with the existing literature, the results show only lim-
ited evidence in support to a hypothesis of a different reaction: apart from readmissions in
2012 (ψ2012,not-for-profit = −0.01964, p-value = 0.0004; ψ2012,private = −0.0096, p-value
= 0.0062), the interaction for readmissions in 2013 and all interactions for transfers, for both
the private for profit and not-for-profit categories, are not statistically significant. This is an in-
teresting result meaning that the monetary incentive is an interesting motivation to improve the
quality of care for all types of ownership and not only for the profit-maximizer providers (profit
hospitals).
3.6 Conclusions and future work
The P4P approach has been adopted in many countries in order to encourage improvements in
the quality of healthcare by supplying financial incentives to healthcare providers. In this study,
we evaluate the impact of a specific P4P program adopted in the Lombardy region (Italy) in
2012. Differently to previous studies, we perform the analysis considering the whole health-
care system, evaluating multiple health outcomes over a number of clinical areas. We analyse
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data over four years, two before (2010/2011) and two after (2012/2013) the implementation of
the program. The policy was applied to all hospitals in the Lombardy region, but the incentive
was calculated only on the basis of the performance of 9 wards. The fact that the selection of
these wards was made exogenously, combined with the fact that we observe a parallel trend pre-
introduction of the policy and that we have found no evidence of spillover effects between the
treated and untreated wards in terms of allocation of resources, have led us to use a multivariate
DID approach for the evaluation of the impact of the policy.
Our study shows that two out of the five health outcomes considered i.e. readmissions and
transfers, support the hypothesis that the P4P introduction had a positive effect on quality. The
picture for the other three health outcomes is more complex than for transfers and readmissions.
Considering the returns to the surgery room, our results show that the P4P incentives improve
the performance for both the treated and untreated wards. We speculate that this may be the
result of improved technology in the surgery room which all the wards have benefited from. The
last two health outcomes, voluntary discharges and mortality, did not show changes that can be
attributed to the P4P adoption. This can be explained by considering the fact that when hospitals
are checked for effectiveness on more than one output, they will focus on those outcomes which
are more easily driven by a managerial intervention in order to improve their performance and
to obtain the financial incentives.
Moreover, our study shows that the medical wards have reacted to the P4P program more
strongly than the surgical wards, whereas only limited evidence is found to suggest that the
policy reaction was different across different types of hospital ownership. Overall, the results
show that the healthcare system in Lombardy was positively impacted by the P4P implementa-
tion, as anticipated by Castaldi et al. (2011): there is evidence of a reduction in some adverse
health outcomes and of a general change in the hospital organization in order to improve the
healthcare services provided to the citizens. Lastly, the evaluation study found no evidence of a
distortion of the hospital behaviour aimed at inflating the performance evaluation, such as cream
skimming behaviour.
The analysis assume linearity between the dependent variable and the covariates. This assump-
tion is supported by the economic literature in casual inference. In particular, Angrist and Pis-
chke (2008) discuss the theoretical and practical advantages of the linear models over gener-
alized linear models in terms of linking inference with causality, and causal interpretation of
regression coefficients. Furthermore, Hellevik (2009) demonstrates that if the purpose of the
analysis is not prediction but causal decomposition, the problem of fitted values falling out the
range 0-1 is no longer relevant. Despite this, when the dependent variable is a rate, statistical
literature suggests to use beta regression models or logistic regressions for proportions or linear
models with log-transformation of the dependent variable. Given this, our choice of a linear link
can be seen as a limitation and future progress of this work could be the application of one of
the suggested approaches (beta regression, etc.).
This study has some implications. Firstly, Lombardy should extend the adoption of the P4P
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program across the whole regional healthcare system in order to improve the overall hospital
activity. Secondly, given the positive impact of the P4P program in Lombardy, the adoption
of a similar strategy is suggested to the other regional healthcare systems in Italy. This would
stimulate improvements in quality for the regions that already perform relatively well, but, in
particular, this would be an important incentive for these regions with a lower qualified health-
care system.
Future work on the evaluation of P4P programs could explore additional aspects, for which data
were currently not available. Firstly, it would be interesting to test the impact of the P4P pro-
gram in terms of the number of intra-hospital infections and complications, or other outcomes
directly related to the performance of the hospitals’ physicians and the improvement of tech-
nology. Secondly, it would be useful to conduct a comparative analysis between the Lombardy
region and neighbouring regions which are not subjected to P4P programmes. This would help
also in controlling for spillover effects between the treated and the untreated wards within the
same hospital, such as those resulting from the sharing of common technology and resources.
Thirdly, our analysis has focussed solely on the impact of the P4P programs on the hospital
effectiveness. It would be interesting to extend the current analysis to understand whether the
monetary incentive had an impact also on the hospital efficiency. Finally, we believe that further
research is needed to assess the impact of P4P programs over a long time frame, as encouraged
by Werner et al. (2011).
Chapter 4
The association between asymmetric
information, hospital competition and
quality of healthcare
In this chapter, we study the effect of competition on adverse hospital health outcomes. In
particular, we consider a context, the healthcare system in Lombardy, in which information
about hospital quality is not publicly available. Using patient-predicted choice probabilities, we
construct a set of competition indices and measure their effect on hospital quality, evaluated by
a composite index of mortality and readmission rates.
4.1 How competition between hospitals may impact quality in health-
care
As introduced in Chapter 1, competition in healthcare is a key issue among the recent reforms
implemented in several Western Countries. These interventions originate from the belief that to
stimulate hospitals’ competition leads to increase NHS quality (Beckert et al. 2012) reducing
unnecessary costs (Kessler and McClellan 2000). Despite this, the wide literature on hospital
competition found mixed results about the effect of competition on quality. Four key factors
exist that may shape how competition between hospitals impacts quality:
1. Institutional settings of the hospital-market supply side (Gaynor et al. 2012, Kessler and
McClellan 2000, Moscone et al. 2012, Propper et al. 2004, Tay 2003)
2. The degree of patient freedom of choice (Beckert et al. 2012, Cooper et al. 2011, Moscone
et al. 2012, Tay 2003, Varkevisser et al. 2012)
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3. The hospital competitive strategy (Cooper et al. 2011, Kessler and McClellan 2000, Tay
2003)
4. The degree of information regarding hospital quality (Dranove et al. 2003, Dranove and
Sfekas 2008).
In order to study the effect of competition on hospital quality, several issues need to be consid-
ered. First of all, in many settings, patients have imperfect information about hospital quality.
Second, measuring hospital quality is difficult, since it involves multiple dimensions (e.g., qual-
ity of life, better treatments, customer satisfaction, etc.). This leaves a certain degree of uncer-
tainty regarding the quality level provided by a hospital. Third, patients may collect different
signals of quality, such as hospital rankings based on some specific indicators (e.g., mortality
rates, readmission rates, etc.), suggestions of the general practitioners (GPs), word-of-mouth
within their social networks. These signals may influence their hospital choice, but it is still
unclear whether they are a determinant of the real choices made by patients. However, patient
hospital choice is the result of a trade–off. This involves the patient’s beliefs regarding hospital
quality and the distance between the patient’s residence and the hospital. Since the distance is a
cost for the patient, the higher is the distance the lower is the chance that a hospital is chosen,
unless the quality difference (between a close and a far hospital) justifies travelling more in order
to be hospitalized.
Most of the previous contributions on hospital competition are based on the seminal paper by
Kessler and McClellan (2000). Their approach is based on modelling patients’ hospital choices.
Predicted patients’ choices are used to build measures of competition, and then these measures
are adopted to model the relationship between competition and hospital quality. However, al-
though recent years have witnessed a growing interest on the competition in the healthcare sec-
tor, the debate about the effect of competition on quality is still alive in the scientific community
as empirical evidence from different countries reports mixed results. While some studies sug-
gest that competition amongst hospitals has positive effects on health outcomes (Gaynor 2016),
others support the argument that more competition may even harm the health of patients (Prop-
per et al. 2004). Our analysis considers a setting in which hospital competition is quality based
and depends on the number of hospitals that a patient can reach in a reasonable time as well as
fixed prices and asymmetric information regarding the quality of providers. In this context, it is
important to understand the possible effects of hospital competition under different degrees of
information regarding quality that is available to patients. We are working under the assumption
that patients are rational agents who will maximize their utility if properly informed regarding
quality and that they will choose the hospital that provides the best combination between quality
and geographical distance (or travel time) from their residence. It is reasonable also to assume
that, for more complicated treatments, patients will be willing to travel more for a high quality
hospital and that, even for non-complicated treatments, patients also will select a high quality
hospital that is relatively close to their residence and not simply the closest hospital.
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4.2 Literature review on competition in healthcare
The literature on hospital competition has focused mainly on the US and UK markets. Although
patients are free to choose in both markets, hospitals in the USA may set both prices and qual-
ity. In contrast, in the UK, hospitals can only move quality since prices are regulated. Most
studies have investigated the effect of hospital competition on health outcomes as measured by
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)(Cooper et al. 2011, Gaynor 2006, Gaynor and Haas-
Wilson 1998, Gaynor et al. 2012, Kessler and McClellan 2000, Propper et al. 2008; 2004, Tay
2003). Recent work, following the approach by Kessler and McClellan (2000), has used pre-
dicted flows based on (exogenous) patient characteristics and patient-to-hospital distance when
computing the HHI, rather than actual patient flows. This allows to avoid endogeneity problems
when studying the effect of the HHI on healthcare quality as well as distortions in defining the
geographical area representing the potential hospital market (Kessler and McClellan 2000). The
geographical area, if defined by using observed choices, may be influenced by hospital quality,
which leads to larger areas for high quality hospitals, and remains unobserved by the researchers.
Several studies have investigated the effects of hospital competition on hospital quality in the
US market. Kessler and McClellan (2000) used individual data on non-rural elderly Medicare
patients hospitalized for heart attack treatment in 1985, 1988, 1991 and 1994. They provided or-
dinary least squares estimates of the effect of hospital competition and showed that competition
leads to better health outcomes, lowering 30-day mortality hospital rates, reducing treatment
costs. Tay (2003) used data from 1994 for patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI).
She estimated a mixed logit model and showed the importance of quality in patient choice and
provided evidence that they are willing to travel more if the quality of treatment is higher.
Various studies have analysed the influence of competition on healthcare quality in the UK.
Propper et al. (2008; 2004) studied hospital mortality rates for AMI and found a negative effect
of competition. They used aggregated hospital level measures and tried to avoid endogeneity
problems in the HHI by estimating potential demand rather than observed choice. Cooper et al.
(2011) implemented a difference-in-differences econometric model to study the effect of recent
UK pro-competition reforms, founding a positive effect on mortality rate. In a more recent study,
Gaynor et al. (2012) adopted patient level data for a coronary artery bypass graft procedure and
investigated the effect of patients’ freedom of choice on mortality rates. They found that giving
patients the possibility of selecting their hospitals when they know the quality of the hospitals
significantly reduces mortality rates. Gaynor et al. (2012) tackled the issue of freedom of choice
and information on hospital quality and the results are very close in spirit to our contribution.
Little empirical work exists on the effect of competition on the healthcare sector in Italy. Moscone
et al. (2012) studied the effect of patient hospital choice of an imperfect measure of hospital
quality (the effect of word-of-mouth social interaction given by the percentage of patients liv-
ing in the same area who have previously made the same treatment choice). They studied the
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choices of patients suffering from heart disease who were receiving treatment in one Italian re-
gion (Lombardy). Using administrative data that included the whole population, they showed
that the informal neighbourhood effect does not influence the health outcomes and even may
lead patients to make suboptimal selections.
Lastly, only few references have explored the possible effects of asymmetric information in
healthcare despite the relevant insights that are achieved by some very famous early contribu-
tions (Akerlof et al. 1970, Spence 1973) and the large number of subsequent references (an
excellent review is in Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). Dranove and Sfekas (2008) analysed the effect
of disclosing hospital report cards in the USA and showed that it may induce selection of pa-
tients, which means that hospitals may not admit patients with bad health statuses because they
do not want to worsen their rankings. Dranove et al. (2003) showed that spreading information
on hospital quality does not necessarily improve the performance of top ranking hospitals, prob-
ably because the rankings confirm patients’ informal perceptions on the different quality levels.
Although Varkevisser et al. (2012) provided evidence that patients tend to choose better quality
hospitals in the Netherlands, their study did not show whether this choice produces a market
premium for top quality hospitals.
Another key factor in the relationship between hospital quality and competition is the choice
of variables representing health outcomes. Several works in the literature use mortality rate as
the quality indicator (see, among others, Kessler and McClellan (2000), Tay (2003), Propper
et al. (2008; 2004), Beckert et al. (2012) and Cooper et al. (2011)). Although most of these
references focused on treatments for AMI, some researchers (see, among others, Goldstein and
Spiegelhalter (1996), Iezzoni et al. (1996) and Lilford et al. (2004)) have criticized the use of
mortality in treatments different from AMI as many diseases (e.g. chronic illness) have very low
mortality risks associated to them. In the USA, there is growing evidence (Neuman et al. 2014)
that mortality rates alone cannot capture hospital differences in treatment provided to patients.
This chapter sheds light on why the empirical literature often rejects the theoretical result that
more competition leads to better health outcomes in a fixed-price setting. The key factor in our
analysis is the effect of the asymmetric information that does not provide to the citizens the
proper tools to make an informed choice of the hospital where to be admitted. This fact has an
impact on the hospital quality, reducing the effect of the competition.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.3 describe the data, whereas Sec-
tion 4.4 presents the econometric strategy. Section 4.5 discusses estimation results, and Section
4.6 concludes with some suggestions for future research.
4.3 The data and descriptive statistics
As introduced in Chapter 1, Lombardy is an interesting case-study for hospital competition due
to the presence of public and private providers that compete with each other in attracting patients.
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Moreover, Lombardy is also a very interesting environment to study the effects of asymmetric
information on hospital competition. In fact, even if the regional government evaluates the hos-
pital quality every year, the results of this evaluation are available only for the hospitals, whereas
they are hidden for both patients and their GPs. In this way the patients’ choice of the hospital
where to be admitted cannot be based on the hospital quality.
We gathered administrative data on all patients who were admitted to the cardiac surgery, car-
diology and general medicine wards in any public or private hospital in the Lombardy region in
2012. Data on each patient, extracted from the hospital discharge charts, include demographic
characteristics such as age, gender and place of residence (the municipality), clinical informa-
tion such as principal diagnosis and codiagnosis, main and secondary procedures, comorbidity,
length of stay, type of admission (planned or via the emergency room), the ward of admission
and type of discharge (e.g. death), financial information such as the DRG and hospital discharge
chart reimbursement and the information on the GP referral. Such data were matched with infor-
mation on hospitals (ownership and teaching status, technology, etc.), and on the travel distance
in minutes from the patient’s residence (the municipality) to the hospital. Information on travel
distance, expressed in units of time, was computed using Google Maps. The algorithm com-
putes the fastest route from an individual’s residence to the hospital by car and the distance is
set to 0 if an individual’s street address and the hospital location are identical. Furthermore, in
order to account for the influence of social relations in the choice of the hospital, in which to
be admitted, we added a network variable in the model. This is measured by the percentage of
citizens living in the same municipality as the patient, who have chosen the same hospital to
be admitted in the 12 months preceding the analysis. The assumption related to this variable is
that in the Lombardy region, like in the rest of Italy, most of the population is concentrated in
small-to-medium sized municipalities that are characterized by a strong historical and cultural
identity as well as autonomy guaranteed by the Italian legislative structure. Family members
usually live within the same municipality and meeting with friends and relatives is encouraged
through local associations, cultural events, activities of the local parishes and so forth. Within
the same municipality, historical, political, social and religious forces may encourage interac-
tion between people, which is the main reason for using this as a reference area for building
the network variable. We include such information, which we call a network effect, with aim
to detect a mechanism shaping the preferences of individuals and ultimately influencing their
decisions about the provider where to be hospitalized.
In order to evaluate the hospital quality we use an adverse outcome measured as the presence
or not oh either mortality or readmission. This outcome is equal to 1 whether the patient dies in
hospital or if the patient dies or is readmitted within 30-days after the discharge.
We removed from the data set any patient whose source of admission was other than elective.
After this cleaning procedure, we were left with a total of 194,020 patients of whom 9,121
were admitted to cardiac surgery, 71,499 to cardiology and 113,400 to general medicine. These
patients were admitted to the cardiac surgery ward of 20 hospitals, the cardiology ward of 76
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hospitals and to the general medicine ward of 124 hospitals in the Lombardy region.
Table 4.1 defines the variables which were selected for the empirical analysis. Table 4.2 pro-
Variables
Individual-Specific Variables
Choiceij 1 if patient i is admitted to hospital j.
Distanceij Time distance from residence of patient i and hospital j (in minutes).
Networkij % of residents living in the same municipality as patient i admitted
in ward w of hospital j in the 12 months previous to the analysis.
Agei Patient i age in years.
Malei 1 if patient i is male,
GPi 100 x n. patients in the zip code sharing the GP with i / n. patients
in the zip code.
Ward- and Hospital-Specific Variables
Adverseoutwj Hospital j composite index of adverse health outcomes
(i.e., 30-day mortality or readmission) in ward w.
Malewj % of males in ward w of hospital j.
Age65wj % of patients over 65 in ward w of hospital j.
ICUwj % of transits in intensive care unit for patients in ward w of hospital j.
DRGWEIwj Average DRG weight in ward w of hospital j.
Privatej 1 if hospital j’s ownership is for-profit.
NFPj 1 if hospital j’s ownership is not-for-profit.
Monoj 1 if hospital j is mono specialized.
Teachingj 1 if hospital j is a teaching hospital.
Technologyj 1 if the hospital j has a high technology assessment
(i.e., an intensive care unit department) and 0 otherwise.
Heartwj 1 if ward w in hospitaljj is cardiac surgery.
Cardiowj 1 if ward w in hospital j is cardiology.
Medicinewj 1 if ward w in hospital j is general medicine.
Bedswj Number of beds in ward w of hospital j.
Rankingwj Percentile rank of ward w in hospital j in the league table
of the Lombardy quality evaluation program.
TABLE 4.1: List of variable definitions
vides descriptive statistics for the set of patient-specific characteristics, whereas Table 4.3 for
the hospital-specific variables. The statistics show that cardiac pathology affects more males
than females and that patients in cardiology and general medicine are older than patients in
cardiac surgery. Looking at the distance variables, we note that patients who are admitted to
cardiac surgery are more willing to travel longer distances and that their network size is smaller
compared with cardiology and general medicine patients. Focusing on the ward and hospital
level variables, we note that general medicine has high mortality rates. As expected, patients
who are admitted to cardiac surgery are (relatively) young and are undergoing highly special-
ized expensive treatment and interventions. Conversely, patients who are admitted to cardiology
and general medicine are older, often affected by a number of comorbidities, and admitted for a
variety of treatments and interventions. Table 4.3 shows also that the three wards have different
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Variables Cardiac Surgery Cardiology General Medicine
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev.
Distanceij 29.18 20.72 19.1 15.72 15.87 13.02
Networkij 38.01 29.77 66.1 33.59 77.86 29.15
Agei 64.78 17.11 69.34 13.82 72.91 15.68
Malei (%) 65.52 47.5 64.78 47.77 49.56 50
GPi 14.11 17.85 14.23 18.02 18.27 20.54
TABLE 4.2: Descriptive statistics of individual-specific variables.
Variables Cardiac Surgery Cardiology General Medicine
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev.
Adverseoutwj (%) 5.31 1.62 7.25 2.54 17.12 5.6
Malewj (%) 66.71 4.74 63.08 6.76 48.32 6.45
Age65wj (%) 64.51 7.68 70.76 8.13 77.05 8.39
ICUwj (%) 76.38 42.47 20.77 40.57 1.55 12.36
DRGWEIwj 5.1 2.86 1.67 1.07 1.07 0.71
NFPj (%) 10 30.77 10.52 30.89 12.1 32.61
Privatej (%) 40 50.26 26.31 44.37 13.59 34.26
Technologyj (%) 95 22 92.1 27.14 74.57 43.55
Teachingj (%) 40 50.26 15.71 36.72 17.81 38.26
Monoj (%) 5 22.36 1.31 11.47 0.91 9.48
Bedswj 21.12 14.83 22.5 16.44 43.87 31.39
Rankingwj 49.45 29.46 53.13 28.21 49.18 27.54
Num of hospitals 20 76 124
TABLE 4.3: Descriptive statistics of ward- and hospital-specific variables.
compositions in terms of ownership and teaching status. Private and teaching hospitals often
have cardiac surgery wards, whereas public, non-teaching hospitals often have cardiology and
general medicine wards. However, as expected, cardiac surgery wards have high technology
equipment. Finally, Table 4.4 offers a set of descriptive statistics on patient-to-hospital distance,
Ward Min 25th Percentile Average Median 75th Percentile Max
Cardiac Surgery 0 16 29.18 24 38 152
Cardiology 0 10 19.1 16 24 188
General Medicine 0 7 15.87 13 20 197
TABLE 4.4: Descriptive statistics of patient-to-hospital time distance by ward.
measured in minutes of time, for the three wards. It is interesting to observe that the average
distance to the cardiology ward is much shorter than for the cardiac surgery ward: about 19 min
for the former versus 29 min for the latter. This may be explained by the fact that patients who
are admitted for cardiac surgery may face more complex interventions and thus are more willing
to travel further to receive high quality treatment. Table 4.4 shows that, overall, in a context of
asymmetric information regarding hospital quality in Lombardy, patients tend to choose nearby
hospitals, showing little propensity to travel far for hospital treatments.
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4.4 The econometric strategy
To study the effect of competition between hospitals on health outcomes we adopt a two-stage
approach. In the first stage we study patient hospital choices as a function of a set of patient
characteristics, the hospital travel distance and the network effect. In the second stage, we
compute a set of HHIs (one for each ward and for each hospital) by using the predicted choice
probabilities estimated in the first stage and we then analyse their effect on hospital quality. In
order to evaluate quality, we focus on a composite index of mortality and readmission rates.
4.4.1 Modelling patients’ hospital choices
In the first stage, we investigate patient choices using the conditional discrete choice model
prosed by McFadden (1973). In our context we aim at describing the choice of a patient (in-
dividual) of the hospital where to be admitted (alternative). Patients choose the hospital where
to be admitted on the basis of their characteristics, the hospital travel distance, and the network
effect described above. Suppose that, for each ward considered in this study (cardiosurgery,
cardiology and medicine), the observable choice of individual i of being admitted to hospital j
is modelled as a conditional logit:
πik =
exp(ρDistanceik + δkNetworkik + γkGPi + βkxi)∑J
j=1 exp(ρDistanceij + δjNetworkij + γjGPi + βjxi)
(4.1)
where πik is the probability that the patient i chooses the hospital k, depending on the patient’s
characteristics and the characteristics of the chosen and of the alternative hospitals. In order
to have the identifiability of the parameters, without lost of generality, we set the parameters
corresponding to the last hospital to 0., i.e. δJ = 0, γJ = 0 and βJ = 0. In Equation (4.1),
the covariates Distanceij , GPi and Networkij are defined as in Table 4.1, and the the vector x of
patient characteristics includes the variables Agei and Malei
A positive and significant coefficient attached to the network effect (δj) means that a subset of
the population, sharing informal information on the quality of the jth hospital, increases the
conditional probability of choosing it for each member of this subset. A negative and significant
coefficient implies that, ceteris paribus, the patients will make a choice that is different from that
of them neighbours. In addiction, by including the variable GPi, which measures the fraction
of patients in the postal code area of patient i sharing a GP with patient i, we aim to capture
the potential impact that the GP’s advice may have on the choice of the hospital at which to be
treated.
We estimate Equation (4.1) for each ward separately by maximum likelihood using the asclogit
procedure in the statistical software Stata 13.
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4.4.2 Constructing a competition index
Once the predicted patients’ choices are modelled, we move to analying the relationship be-
tween competition and quality. In order to achieve this aim, we need to convert the predicted
choices obtained from Equation (4.1) into a competition index. Using the predicted probabilities
at this stage avoids potential endogeneity in patient flows and in the definition of hospital catch-
ment areas as underlined by Kessler and McClellan (2000). In fact, real patient flows can be
influenced by variables such as the teaching status or the size of a hospital, which are connected
with hospital quality. The endogeneity problem may also arise because hospitals with higher
quality could obtain higher market shares and thus the index of competition may be affected by
the dependent variable. Such endogeneity may bias results when regressing the HHI on health
outcomes. As indicated by Kessler and McClellan (2000), building theoretical patients based on
exogenous factors may overcome these problems.
Previous literature defines the potential markets of hospital-specific HHIs as the area surround-
ing each hospital by using an array of arbitrary lengths (e.g. 30 km) (Bloom et al. 2015, Sicil-
iani and Martin 2007). To avoid the possible biases in computing the HHI by using these ad hoc
methods, we follow Kessler and McClellan (2000) and use the predicted flows that are estimated
by Equation (4.1) to compute HHI indices by exogenously assigning each patient to a given ge-
ographic area identified by the local healthcare zone, called the LHA. In Lombardy, there are
15 LHAs and each patient is exogenously assigned to one. Let Nq be the number of patients i
living in the LHA q. For each patient i in this area, let π̂iwj be the predicted probability that for
a ward w the patient i chooses hospital j. The share of patients living in the LHA area q who












where J is the number of hospitals operating within a given ward (e.g. cardiology) in Lombardy.
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where Nwj is the total number of patients admitted in ward w of hospital j in Lombardy. The
last step is computing the HHI for ward w in hospital j, given by




where the value 10,000 is arbitrarily chosen to rescale the index.
Hence, each ward–hospital has an HHI competition index that is a weighted average (using
each hospital patient share in LHA q) of the exogenously defined LHA q competition index.
HHIwj varies between 10, 000 ∗ 1J (competition) and 10, 000 (monopoly), with larger values
indicating a decrease in the degree of competition.
4.4.3 Modelling the effect of competition on the hospital quality
The second stage of our econometric approach is designed to verify the influence of competition
on hospital adverse health outcomes. Let Adverseoutwj be the adverse health outcome rate for
ward w of hospital j, as defined in Table 4.1. In our second stage we consider the following
multilevel model, based on the assumptions described in Section 1.4
Adverseoutwj = α+ βxwj + γzj + θHHIwj + uj + εwj , (4.6)
where xwj is a set of ward and hospital-specific characteristics zj is a set of hospital-specific
attributes and uj is a hospital-specific random effect. As regressors, in addition to the key vari-
able HHI, we control also for other covariates. We include the following variables, defined in
Table 4.1: Age65wj in order to account for patient health status, which is highly correlated
with chronic conditions, DRGWEIwj and ICUwj , with the aim of identifying the treatment
complexity. Further, we have included the dummies Monoj , Teachingj , NFPj , Privatej , and
Technologyj . Since we do not have information on specific technological equipment, we adopt
the presence in hospital i of an intensive care unit as a proxy for hospital technology classifi-
cation. Although this feature fits well in the case of general medicine and cardiology, for heart
surgery we identify a set of additional treatments that require high technology equipment such
as
1. repair of atrial and ventricular septa with prostheses,
2. total repair of certain congenital cardiac anomalies and
3. heart replacement procedures.
Finally, we include ward dummies, Heartwj and Cardiowj , and an interaction term between the
HHI and the hospital ownership.
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The main focus is on the magnitude and significance of the parameter related to the HHI covari-
ate. A positive and significant coefficient indicates that more competition increases the level of
quality that is offered by hospitals, whereas a coefficient that is statistically insignificant would
point to no effect of competition.
To conclude, we test whether there is a relationship between the hospital quality ranking evalu-
ated by the regional healthcare directorate, and the patient choices predicted by Equation (4.1).
Specifically, we estimate the following multilevel model by using data at the patient level:
π̂iwj = α+ βRankingwj + γBedswj + ηHeartwj + λCardiowj + uj + εwj , (4.7)
where π̂iwj is patient i’s maximum probability among all predicted probabilities (obtained from
Equation (4.1)) of selecting each hospital in the region with ward w, whereas Rankingwj is
the hospital level ranking calculated by the Lombardy region within its quality evaluation pro-
gramme. Bedswj is the number of beds for each ward and Heartwj and Cardiowj are ward fixed
effects to control for hospital-specific characteristics. An insignificant coefficient for the ranking
variable indicates that the levels of hospital quality do not drive patients’ choices and this would
be a proof of the effect of the asymmetric information.
4.5 Estimation results
Table 4.5 summarizes results for the model in Equation (4.1). It reports a set of statistics on
the regression coefficients estimated by maximum likelihood. For brevity we provide synthetic
statistics of the hospital-specific estimates. As expected, patient-to-hospital travel distance has a
negative influence on choices, implying that patients are more likely to choose closer hospitals
relative to similar alternatives at longer distances (Sivey 2012). The coefficient that is attached
to GPi is positive, though with a mild effect and weak evidence.
Looking at the results for the network variable, it is interesting to observe that the estimated
coefficients are large and the average t-ratio is statistically significant in all models, thus indicat-
ing neighbourhood effects. For cardiac surgery, the average coefficient is higher than for other
wards, indicating that patients, ceteris paribus, are strongly influenced by the choice of their
neighbours. We observe that patients who are admitted to this ward often need complicated and
risky interventions and may spend more time and effort on gathering information on the quality
of the ward when compared with other patients.
Table 4.6 shows the distribution of the HHIs calculated for the three wards and computed by
using theoretical patient flows obtained by estimating Equation (4.1). The average, median,
25th and 75th percentiles of the HHI are consistently higher for heart surgery, indicating a lower
degree of competition compared with cardiology and general medicine. It is interesting that
we obtain the largest HHIs for hospitals that are quasi-local monopolists –in rural areas or very
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Cardiac Surgery Cardiology General Medicine
Independent Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Variables error error error
Distanceij -0.100*** 0.001 -0.160*** 0.001 -0.171*** 0.001
Networkij
Mean 5.732 0.516 4.024 0.522 1.036 0.25
Standard deviation 3.701 11.556 3.786
Agei
Mean 0.001 0.007 0.024 0.007 0.021 0.005
Standard deviation 0.028 0.032 0.025
Malei
Mean -0.094 0.188 -0.064 0.199 0.012 0.152
Standard deviation 0.489 0.385 0.296
GPi
Mean 0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.006 -0.0002 0.005
Standard deviation 0.013 0.019 0.013
Constant
Mean 1,730 0.516 -5.931 0.721 -3.316 0.336
Standard deviation 2.717 11.888 4.061
Observations 172,280 4,601,876 12,700,700
BIC 29,003.20 228,815.30 370,129.80
Note: *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance.
TABLE 4.5: Estimated regression coefficients of the model in Equation (4.1) for each of the 3
wards considered in this study. Summary statistics are given for the estimated parameters
across all hospitals.
small cities– whereas the lowest HHI values are attached to hospitals in the densely populated
areas of Milan and Bergamo.
Ward Mean Min 25th Median 75th Max
(St.Dev.) percentile percentile
Cardiac Surgery 2,323.27 1,438.92 1,641.56 2,007.57 2,532.19 6,480.12
(1,140.86) (Ca’ Granda Niguarda) (C. Poma Mantua)
Cardiology 1,319.98 564.94 875.74 1,201.26 1,538.25 3,739.27
(630.86) (Fatebenefratelli Milan) (Valcamonica Esine)
General Medicine 1,041.85 550.5 642.11 949.65 1,115.02 5,238.45
(601.2) (San Pellegrino Terme) (Valcamonica Esine)
TABLE 4.6: Descriptive statistics of the HHI from equation (4.5), computed for each ward.
Table 4.7 shows the estimation results for Equation (4.6), in order to quantify the influence of
competition on hospital quality, measured by the dependent variable Adverseoutwj . Model 1
in Table 4.7 includes only patients’ covariates, whereas in Model 2 hospital covariates are in-
cluded. In Model 3 we control for the interaction between the competition index HHI and the
hospital ownership. In all specifications we control for the ward of discharge. In all the estimates
in Table 4.7 the coefficient related to the HHI is statistically insignificant. The interaction term
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between the HHI and ownership status is also insignificant, indicating that there are no signifi-
cant differences regarding the effect of competition on adverse outcomes for public, private and
not-for-profit hospitals.
Independent Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
variables Coeff. (St. err.) Coeff. (St. err.) Coeff. (St. err.)
HHIwj 0.031 (0.051) 0.013 (0.039) 0.018 (0.056)
Age65wj 0.193 (0.047)*** 0.212 (0.048)*** 0.215 (0.055)***
Malewj -0.111 (0.090) -0.046 (0.104) -0.046 (0.105))
DRGWEIwj 0.006 (0.018) 0.006 (0.014) 0.008 (0.014)
ICUwj -0.009 (0.026) -0.037 (0.029) -0.037 (0.031)
Heartwj -0.137 (0.072)* -0.105 (0.064) -0.109 (0.062)*
Cardiowj -0.106 (0.014)*** -0.095 (0.016)*** -0.096 (0.020)***
Technologyj 0.022 (0.008)*** 0.022 (0.010)**
Monoj -0.005 (0.020) -0.005 (0.022)
Teachingj -0.004 (0.008) -0.002 (0.008)
NFPj -0.026 (0.013)** -0.014 (0.038)
Privatej -0.013 (0.007)* -0.017 (0.017)
HHIj*NFPj -0.110 (0.274)
HHIj*Privatej 0.034 (0.134)
Constant 0.069 (0.050) 0.016 (0.043) 0.013 (0.056)
Num of Obs. 220 220 220
Loglikelihood 382.51 391.82 392.19
Note: *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance.
TABLE 4.7: Estimated regression coefficients of the model in Equation (4.6) to detect the
effect of competition. Model 1 includes the characteristics of the patients in each ward. In
Model 2 hospitals’ characteristics are added. In Model 3 we include also an interaction
between cooperation and hospital ownership.
As for the remaining regressors, the dummy variable for heart surgery has a negative and
(weakly) significant coefficient in Model 1, suggesting that the likelihood of adverse outcomes
for patients in this ward is relatively lower than for patients in general medicine. The estimated
coefficient attached to Age65wj is positive and statistically significant in all models, indicating
that hospitals with a higher share of patients who are older than 65 years tend to have more ad-
verse health outcomes. High technology hospitals have more adverse outcomes than non-high-
technology hospitals. There is weak statistically significant evidence in Model 2 that private
hospitals have lower adverse outcome rates than public hospitals.
We explain the absence of evidence of a relationship between quality and competition by the
presence of asymmetric information about the ’true’ quality of hospitals, which was also sug-
gested by Moscone et al. (2012). In fact, the presence of asymmetric information may act as a
barrier for competition to work effectively, since it may reduce the possible returns from invest-
ing in hospital quality.
Finally, Table 4.8 reports results for the estimation of the effect of hospital quality ranking on
patient-predicted choice probabilities obtained from Equation (4.1). It is interesting that the
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effect of hospital rankings on predicted probabilities is always statistically insignificant. This
result reinforces the role that is played by the presence of asymmetric information, which means
that patients are correctly informed about the hospital quality.







Num of Obs. 171,616
ICC 0.67
Note: Results show estimates of multilevel model in equation 4.6.
*** 1% significance.
TABLE 4.8: Estimated regression coefficients from Equation 4.7, which study the impact of
hospital quality ranking on patient-predicted choice probabilities. This analysis allows us to
detect the effect of the asymmetric information.
4.6 Concluding remarks and future work
In this chapter we investigated how competition affects the health of patients in regional quasi-
market. We found that more competition does not seem to have a significant influence on the
quality of hospitals. One explanation for this result is the lack of publicly available information
on the quality of hospitals. The presence of such asymmetric information may exacerbate the in-
fluence of information that is gathered locally. It may also result in a reduced freedom of choice
for patients, a lower degree of competition between hospitals and a lack of market premium
for top quality hospitals. Our results point to the network effect as a barrier for competition to
work effectively and indicate that patient choice is likely to be not affected by the true quality of
hospitals. Our analysis may shed light on why empirical literature often rejects the theoretical
result that more competition should lead to better health when prices are fixed.
Our contribution has two important policy implications. First, the results show that it is nec-
essary and urgent to disclose information regarding hospital quality ranking computed within
the regional quality evaluation programme, to GPs, patients and the wider public. As shown by
Austin et al. (2015), a set of indicators delivered to the public must remain fixed for a sufficiently
long period of time to avoid misunderstandings and confusion. As such, the presence of asym-
metric information will be reduced and patients will tend to choose high quality hospitals and to
enjoy the benefits of having invested in better healthcare. Although publicly available hospital
rankings may certainly support patient choice and encourage providers to improve their qual-
ity, this may not be enough to encourage low quality hospitals to improve their quality of care.
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Hence, our second policy implication is that the regional government should make a special
intervention on behalf of these hospitals. For instance, such an intervention may give hospitals
with only one or two wards, which is significantly below the regional average (i.e. indicated as
belonging to group 3 within the quality evaluation programme), a time period–say, 1-2 years–
within which they must make improvements. If a ward is still ranked in the bottom quality group
after this period of time, it would be closed or receive a monetary penalty. These interventions
in the regional hospital structure are essential to form a competitive hospital market.
Our results are open to further new research developments. In this chapter, following Moscone
et al. (2012), we have used hospital network effects as a proxy for patient sensitivity to local
information or social interaction. However, we observe that social interaction may be the result
of other forces such as contextual or correlated effects (Brock and Durlauf 2001, Manski 1993).
Future work will consider strategies for disentangling social interaction from the effect of other
factors. A limitation of our work is that the study focuses on only a single cross-section. Future
work will explore whether our results are consistent when using panel data. Another interesting
extension is the analysis of healthcare quality at the surgical or team level or using the average
surgical quality within the ward weighted by the number of surgeries. In fact, patients could
choose their provider depending on the national and international reputation of a particular sur-
geon or medical team and average surgical quality is a more accurate measure of quality.
Finally, we remark that the indicators that are usually used in the literature are not sufficiently
sensitive to detect variations in ward level quality. Although in this chapter we have mitigated
this issue by using a composite index of adverse health outcomes, future work should include
other indicators for hospital quality–e.g. clinical indicators describing the quality of the treat-
ment that is used in various pathological conditions (Damberg et al. 1998, Iezzoni et al. 1996),
process measures such as the frequency of using best practices in the treatment of a pathology
(Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization (Davies 1994)), sentinel events
representing unexpected occurrences (e.g. death or severe physical or psychological injury)
(Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization (Davies 1994)) and quality-of-
life outcomes indicating the general health condition of the patient (Damberg et al. 1998).
Chapter 5
The effect of cooperation on quality in
the healthcare sector
Regardless of the specifics of a healthcare system, hospitals can be considered as altruistic eco-
nomic agents which cooperate in order to improve the quality provided to the citizens.
In this chapter, we evaluate whether cooperation between hospitals has an impact on the hospi-
tals’ quality. We analyse the effect of cooperation on quality, by taking the network of patients’
transfers between hospitals as a proxy of their level of cooperation. Firstly, we exploit data at
patient and hospital level, and we identify the determinants of patients’ flows with the use of
a social relations model that accounts, among other things, for a potential correlation among
the group specific effects of origin and destination hospitals. Secondly, we move beyond the
discussion on the determinants of the network of patients’ flows to assess whether this network
between hospitals has a positive or negative effect on the overall mortality, hence on the quality
provided to both the origin and destination hospitals.
5.1 Cooperation between hospitals in healthcare
This chapter is stimulated by a lack of existing literature on the effects of cooperation in health-
care. While focussing mostly on boosting competition in healthcare systems, policy makers
have disregarded collaboration among providers as a force that can be shaped to improve the
quality and efficiency of healthcare systems. In this work we analyse how hospitals cooperate in
a competitive environment and we measure the determinants and outcomes of such cooperation.
In Chapter 4 we presented a growing literature that studies how pro-competition reforms, imple-
mented in a number of Western countries, can trigger interaction and reaction processes between
hospitals and can have an impact on hospital decisions and hospital quality. According to this
view, hospitals may set their own quality of services, adjusting their decisions by looking at
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the quality offered by neighbouring hospitals, often taken as those located within the same geo-
graphical area.
Aside from the aspect of competition, it is likely that collaboration per se plays an important
role in boosting the quality of healthcare. Hospitals, motivated by reasons such as convenience
or altruism, may decide to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation with each other, leading
to improvements in overall health indicators. Collaboration among healthcare providers can
take different forms. The most common form of formal collaboration is the merging process.
Hospital merging is often defined as the consolidation with local competitors, which can take
two form: in local multi-hospital systems, two or more hospitals in the same geographic mar-
ket have common ownership, but maintain separate physical facilities and financial activities.
In local mergers two or more hospitals in the same local market have common ownership and
unify financial records, and may or not consolidate physical facilities (Dranove and Lindrooth
2003). The literature on mergers between private hospitals in US seems to lead little benefits in
terms of prices and costs (Vogt and Town 2006). A recent work by Gaynor et al. (2012), con-
tributed to this literature studying the effect of the Labour Party reform of healthcare in 1997,
which imposed a radical programme of hospital closure, merging many hospitals geographically
co-located. Extending the set of outcomes including financial performance, productivity, wait-
ing times and clinical quality, the authors find little evidence that mergers increase the quality
of the NHS. Furthermore, consolidation seems to reduce the role of the competition. Different
common forms of cooperation concern clinical network information sharing, joint treatment or
diagnostic centers, new shared assets and joint construction of new facilities. The small results
produced by formal (or imposed) types of cooperation are not surprising. As argued by Westra
et al. (2017), cooperation can influence outcomes overcoming formal agreements to constitute
factual collaboration. Indeed, one the main feature of the informal types of cooperation is that
there exists neither formal agreements between the two parties nor regional guidelines that reg-
ulate the flow of patients, but only the decision to cooperate. In the existing literature two forms
of informal cooperation have been studied: patient transfers and professionals’ affiliations. The
cooperation in terms of professionals’ affiliations cen be observed within hospital boundaries
or in terms of professional sharing their knowledge. This form of cooperation create channels
for transferring best-practices, and creating learning opportunities which should be related with
outcomes. Evidence in the literature are mixed. While some studies indicate positive effect
of inter-organizational learning (Westra et al. 2016), other studies indicate that physicians are
unable to duplicate their performance from one organization to the next (Huckman and Pisano
2006, Westert et al. 1993). The second form of cooperation relates the inter-hospital patient
transfers (also known as inter-facility or secondary transfers), namely the need for a hospital to
transfer a patient when the diagnostic and therapeutic facilities required for that patient are not
available at the given hospital, or when the complex case has been resolved and the patient can
be transferred in a facility that is less technology intensive.
The aim of this chapter is to identify a positive effect of the hospital cooperation and hospital
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quality. This aim is also based on the hypothesis that hospitals are altruistic agents, and they
decide to transfer their patients to other hospitals when the benefits of transfer outweigh the
risks. Altruism in healthcare is a limited topic of research, but growing evidence in the literature
support this concept. In Arrow (1963) physician are differentiated by typical profit-maximizing
economic agents, considering the patient benefits as a fundamental reason the be altruistic. Sim-
ilar arguments can be found in the following literature, where altruism in healthcare has been
considered as a measurable behavior, using discrete choice experiments (Ellis and McGuire
1986). Finally, a general overview is collected in Galizzi et al. (2015), where it is recognized
that evidence in supporting the hypothesis of altruism in healthcare are rapidly growing. While
the decision to transfer a patient is usually driven by matters such as infrastructure and availabil-
ity of specialized care, the choice of the destination hospital by the manager of the referring (or
origin) hospital is driven, among other things, by its proximity, availability and quality of care.
However, one complication is that hospitals may not know the distribution of quality across the
other hospitals in the healthcare sector, thus their choice will be driven by a measure of perceived
quality. This source of asymmetric information, as discussed in Chapter 4, may produce two ef-
fects: if the perceived quality is reflecting the “true quality”, we should expect that cooperation
will improve health outcomes. However, if the perceived quality is negatively associated with
the “true quality”, cooperation may even harm patients. Hence, in this chapter we will study the
impact that an informal mechanism of cooperation via inter-hospital patients’ transfers has on
the overall hospital quality of both origin and destination hospitals. We will first investigate the
determinants of patients’ transfers between hospitals, with the aim of finding some exogenous
to quality, and we will then quantify their impact on hospital quality.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2 we review the existing literature;
in Section 5.3 we discuss the healthcare setting and the data, in Section 5.4 we study the deter-
minants of patients’ transfers; in Section5.5 we analyse the impact of cooperation on the quality
of the healthcare system, and Section 5.6 concludes with some final remarks.
5.2 Literature background
Healthcare providers are increasing their level of cooperation and policy makers are called to
strengthen interactions among healthcare stakeholders to improve both efficiency and quality of
care (Mascia et al. 2012). Cooperation between economic agents in the healthcare sector can
be represented by a network and studied using network models. Within the several applications
of network analysis, we are focusing on the networks defined by patients’ flows. These can
be expressed as patients’ mobility between regions or Local Health Authorities (LHA), or as
patient’s transfers. The first type of these networks is used to study the policy implications of
inter-regional mobility. The majority of these studies adopt gravity models (Silva and Tenreyro
2006), where the flow of patients between two regions (or LHAs) is modelled as a function of
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the characteristics of the origin and destination region (or LHA), as well as the geographical
distance amongst them. Within these studies, Levaggi and Zanola (2004) estimate a regres-
sion model for net patients’ migration during the period 1994-1997. Empirical results show
a south to north pattern of patients’ mobility. The authors find that in wealthier regions there
is a higher quality of services with a low outflow mobility. Similar results have been found
for Spain (Cantarero 2006) and Japan (Shinjo and Aramaki 2012). In the same way, Fabbri and
Robone (2010) focus on bilateral patient flows occurred in 2001, adopting spatial analysis. They
show that most advanced LHAs are more engaged in containing patients outflow and exporting
hospital services. Balia et al. (2018) study patients’ flows among Italian regions for the period
2001-2010 using a dynamic spatially correlated random effect gravity model. They find that in-
come, hospital capacity, and an indicator of regional technology level are the main determinants
of flows.
The second way to study patients’ flows concerns the sharing of patients. A specific literature
focuses on collaboration in healthcare by studying networks of physicians (i.e GPs), but only
few works look directly at the hospital collaboration, in terms of transfers of patients between
hospitals (Barnett et al. 2011, Landon et al. 2012, Pollack et al. 2012). In this chapter we take
this network as a proxy for the hospital cooperation, and we are interested in explaining these
flows, and in quantifying their impact on quality.
The paper by Mackenzie et al. (1997) is considered one of the first attempts to analyse patients
transfers between healthcare providers. Using data gathered from a survey performed on 278 in-
tensive care units in 1994 in UK, the authors provide a descriptive analysis of patients transfers,
and show how such an analysis can be used to drive a targeted allocation of patients transfers.
Iwashyna et al. (2009), adopting an exploratory data analysis on Medicare patients in Connecti-
cut, find that more critical patients tend to be transferred to high technology hospitals. Iwashyna
et al. (2009), using statistical network analysis on nationwide US Medicare data find that pa-
tients transfer is not randomly distributed and that the centrality of a hospital in the network
is associated with increased capability in delivery of services, suggesting that transfers direct
patients toward better resourced hospitals.
A group of papers, on the other hand, has studied patients transfers by analyzing the main drivers
of hospital cooperation. Lee et al. (2011), using data from hospital discharges in California, use
a regression framework and a set of centrality indices and hospital characteristics, find that can-
cer specialized hospitals are more likely to receive transfers as well as the hospitals with higher
patients’ volume. However, the authors do not find a clear association between geographical dis-
tance between hospitals and transfers. Lomi and Pallotti (2012) and Caimo et al. (2017) adopt
Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM) to describe the factors related with the presence
of cooperation among hospitals. They control for indices measuring the presence of an edge
between hospitals, the presence of reciprocity in the edges, as well as the impact of the distance
between hospitals as an effect that can affects costs and risks of a transfer. Using administrative
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data for 91 hospitals located in the Lazio region (Italy), the authors find that hospitals’ proxim-
ity and sharing an administrative membership facilitate cooperation. Furthermore, they find the
presence of local networks, with the tendency to reciprocity among hospitals.
The works reviewed above have contributed to identifying the determinants of cooperation de-
fined by patients’ transfers. There is a lack of knowledge about the relationship between the
network of patients’ transfers and the hospital quality. In this perspective, Mascia et al. (2012)
use a panel negative binomial regression on administrative Italian data for 35 hospitals. The
authors consider the number of transfers as dependent variable, and include as quality-related
covariate the 45-day readmission rate. This paper concludes that patients’ transfers are posi-
tively correlated with volume of hospitalizations and the membership to the same LHA, and
negatively correlated with geographical distance. However, the hospitals with a better perfor-
mance in terms of readmission are less involved in patients’ transfers. Along the same lines,
Lomi et al. (2014), using Italian data on 35 hospitals, analyse the relationship between patients
transfers and risk-adjusted readmission rate. They adopt a multiplicative Cox function for empir-
ical relational events (the transfers), finding that patients tend to be moved to hospitals providing
better quality (i.e. lower risk-adjusted readmission rate). To the best of our knowledge, Mascia
et al. (2015) is the only paper which studies the effect of patients’ transfers on hospital quality.
The authors analyse the effect of cooperation on hospital quality, using Italian data on 31 hos-
pitals. They adopt a multilevel model approach to describe the impact of measures of centrality
and ego-network density on readmissions within 45-days after the discharge. In this paper, the
authors find that a dense network is more likely to reduce the quality provided.
In this chapter we propose a global approach considering both the factors influencing the hospital
cooperation as well as the effect of this cooperation on quality. Consistently with the literature,
we measure inter-hospital collaboration using the patients’ transfers. We describe the charac-
teristics of the network of transfers by applying, for the first time to the healthcare sector, the
social relations model in the form proposed by Hoff (2005), where both the effects of the sender
and receiver hospitals, their correlation and their reciprocity is considered. This analysis allows
the identification of the exogenous determinants of transfers which can be used in a subsequent
analysis to test the effect of inter-hospital collaboration on hospital quality.
5.3 Data
The context of this study has been introduced in Chapter 1, where we described the Lombardy
healthcare system in detail, and, in particular, the reimbursement system based on DRGs and
the presence of private and public providers competing with each other for patients.
In this chapter, we analyse data on patients discharged from 145 hospitals accredited with the re-
gional healthcare system in Lombardy in 2014. In this year the hospitalizations were 1,541,996,
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of which 84% were ordinary and 16% were in day hospital or day surgery. Furthermore, hospi-
talizations of patients living outside the Lombardy region accounted for 10% of all admissions.
The hospital discharge data contains demographic information such as age and gender, informa-
tion on hospitalization (length of stay, special-care unit use, transfers within the same hospital
or through other facilities, and within-hospital mortality), and a total of 6 diagnosis codes and
surgical procedures defined according to the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Re-
vision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9- CM). Only ordinary hospitalizations for patients aged
more than 2 years were retained in the sample. Both planned and unplanned admissions are
considered in line with the criteria adopted in similar studies (Lomi et al. 2014, Mascia et al.
2015; 2012). In the analysis of hospital cooperation in terms of patients transfers, there is no
evidence to consider that the planning of the hospitalization may affect the hospital coopera-
tion. Given this, unfortunately, the available data do not allow us to identify cases like urgent
patients treated in the emergency department of one hospital and then directly transferred to
another hospital more experienced in treating those specific patients. In this case, when the ad-
mission to the ED is followed by a transfer to another hospital, the patient is not recorded as
hospitalized in the first hospital. To the best of our knowledge, this is in line with the rest of
the literature about patients transfers and therefore considered as a common limitation among
similar studies. Table 5.1 provides a set of descriptive statistics split by hospital ownership and
Private Hospitals Public Hospitals
mean sd mean sd
Outcomes
Transfers 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14
Mortality 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24
Patients Characteristics
Age 62.27 18.56 60.29 20.26
Female 0.51 0.50 0.55 0.50
Comorbidities 0.59 0.89 0.65 0.94
DRG Weight 1.34 1.25 1.21 1.21
Hospitals
Num of Hospitals 65 80
Num of Transfers 3,024 12,492
Num of Hospitalizations 256,909 643,242
TABLE 5.1: Descriptive statistics about outcomes, patients’ characteristics and hospitals
considered in the analysis. Information is split by hospital ownership.
grouped by outcomes, patients characteristics and hospitals. Around 45% of the hospitals are
private, although they only cover 28% of the hospitalizations. It is interesting to observe that,
while patient’s demographic characteristics (age and gender) are similar for private and public
hospitals, their case-mix is quite different, with private hospitals having on average patients with
less comorbidities and higher DRG weight. This may be explained, at least in part, by the higher
cream-skimming policy adopted by private hospitals (Berta et al. 2010). Total mortality rates are
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similar for both public and private healthcare providers, whereas the level of transfers is double
in public hospitals.
5.4 Finding the determinants of network of transfers
Measuring hospital cooperation using the patients’ transfers leads us to the definition of a net-
work among hospitals in Lombardy. In this network each hospital is a node and the edges are
Private Hospitals Public Hospitals Total
mean sd mean sd mean sd
In–centrality 0.38 0.30 1.00 0.64 0.74 0.61
In–strength 54.30 42.79 144.00 91.55 106.88 87.20
Out–centrality 0.45 0.73 0.95 0.99 0.74 0.93
Out–strength 64.32 105.50 136.93 143.27 106.88 133.50
Num of Hospitals 65 80 145
TABLE 5.2: Network description split by hospital ownership. In-centrality refers to the
number of hospitals from which a hospital receives transferred patients. In-strength is the total
number of patients received by a hospital. Out-centrality is the number of hospitals where the
patients are transferred from a hospital. Out-strength is the number of patients transferred by a
hospital.
defined by the connections between two hospitals with a weight defined by the number of the
patients transfers. In Table 5.2 we describe this network using strength indices and centrality
indices which are normalized for the total number of hospitals, i.e. the total number of nodes
in the network. The in-centrality measures the number of hospitals from which a hospital re-
ceives transferred patients, whereas the out-centrality indicates the number of hospitals where
the patients are transferred from a hospital. On the other hand, strength indices define the total
number of patients moved in the hospital network. The in-strength index refers to the number of
patients received by a hospital, whereas the out-strength index measures the number of patients
transferred by a hospital (Fernández-Gracia et al. 2017). Private hospitals show a higher in-
centrality index compared to the out-centrality, whereas the inverse is observed for public ones.
This confirms that the private hospitals are more involved in the network as sender hospitals
than receiver. The same relationship is explained by the strength indices, evidencing that public
hospitals are more engaged in a cooperative framework defined by the patients’ transfers.
In order to identify partitions of the network where the nodes belonging to the same community
strongly connected among them and sparsely connected with the nodes belonging to differ-
ent communities, the hospitals’ network has been analyzed applying the community detection
method of Blondel et al. (2008). This community detection method, based on the improvement
of the modularity of the identified communities, is one of the best performer methods in the
comparison provided by Yang et al. (2016). The goodness of the community detection has been
evaluated on the basis of the modularity index M of a network with N nodes and m links. Let






































































































FIGURE 5.1: Maps of the hospitals and their belonging to the communities detected in the
network of patients’ transfers using the multilevel community detection method













where A is the adjacency matrix of the network, ki is the degree of the node i, Ci = 1 if vertex
i. The modularity indexM increases when the community detection identifies nontrivial groups
compared with a random assignment of the nodes to the groups.
In our analysis the modularity shows a strong relationship between the communities identified
in the network and suggest a relationship with the geographical location, as can be observed in
Figure 5.1. Nine communities are detected and most of them correspond to specific municipal-
ities in Lombardy (Pavia, Lodi and Bergamo, respectively identified by orange, red and green
dots). The metropolitan area of Milan, where the most part of the hospitals are located, is char-
acterized by three different communities. The eastern part of Milan shares the community with
the municipality of Monza-Brianza (black dots), whereas the western part shares the hospitals
with the community of Varese (yellow dots). The central part of this metropolitan area identifies
one single community (blu dots). Finally two more communities are identified. The northern
one is characterized by the presence of the Alps mountains and include the municipalities of
Sondrio, Como and Lecco (purple dots). The last community detected is defined by the eastern
part of the region and is shared by the municipality of Cremona, Mantua and Brescia (azure
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dots). The community detection process has shown how both the distance between hospitals
and the administrative co-membership are substantial factors in defining the hospitals’ network,
consistently with the literature (Caimo et al. 2017, Lomi and Pallotti 2012, Mascia et al. 2012).
On the basis of this analysis, we will include distance, which is also directly correlated with
co-memberships on our model of patients’ transfers.
In particular we aim to model patients’ transfers using exogenous covariates not related to qual-
ity. We define a transfer between hospitals by a patient discharged from a hospital and then
admitted in another hospital on the same day or the next one (Iwashyna et al. 2009). In order
to exclude any patients’ involvement in this process, we exclude the voluntary discharges de-
cided by the patients. Let then Tij define the number of transfers between hospital i and j. The
transfers are modelled by
Tij = α+ βHDi + γHDj + δAi + ζAj + φDWi+
+ ψDWj + %Ci + θCj + ηDij + εij
(5.2)
εij = ai + bj + ϑij
(ai, bi)














where ai and bj , with i = 1...N and j = 1...N , are the random effects for the sender and













ϑ + 2σab, E(εijεkj) = σ
2
b ,
E(εijεkl) = 0, E(εijεki) = σab
where σ2a represents the correlation of observations having a common hospital sender, whereas
σ2b defines the dependence of observations having a common hospital receiver, and ρ measure
the “reciprocity” between sender and receiver hospitals, that is the dyadic correlation between
the observation i, j and j, i.
This social relations model belongs to the class of mixed models where random effects are
included in order to control for both sender and receiver hospitals. We estimate the model in
Equation (5.2) using the ame function in the AMEN R-package (Hoff et al. 2017) that allows
us to deal with dyadic variables and statistical dependencies in the data. This R-package does
not support count dependent variable, thus we normalize the variable Tij , using an Anscombe
transformation (Anscombe 1948), and we assume a Gaussian distribution for the errors.
In Equation (5.2) we have included a number of covariates for both the origin (i) and destination
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(j) hospital. In particular, we control for the number of discharges, in order to rescale the
dependent variable. The variable DRG Weight (DW ) is a measure of resources the hospital
employs to treat patients, and patients’ age (A) is measured as an average at the hospital level.
Both these variables are included in the model as a proxy of patients’ severity. In addition,
we include in the model a dyadic geographical variable, D, indicating the distance between
hospitals. We also control for the degree of centrality (C) of each origin and destination hospital
in the network in a geographical sense. In particular, the degree of centrality index measures
the number of edges for each hospital (vertex) in the network based on the distances among
hospitals. This index is calculated starting from an adjacency matrix, that define an edge if
two hospitals are distant less than 30 minutes of effective time travel. Including the origin and
destination degree of centrality means adjusting the model for the hospitals’ concentration in
a pre-defined space. The hypothesis is that a higher value of this index for the origin hospital
indicates a wider choice set for the hospital that needs to decide where to transfer a patient.
Table 5.3 shows the estimated coefficients of the social relations model in Equation 5.2. The
Estimate Std. Error
Intercept 3.0321*** 0.5481
Distance (Dij) -0.0258*** 0.0011
Origin
Num of Hospital Discharges (HDi) 0.0001*** 0.0002
DRG Weight (DWi) 0.3967** 0.1652
Age (Ai) -0.0021 0.0052
Centrality Index (Ci) -2.5273*** 0.2641
Destination
Num of Hospital Discharges (HDj) 0.0001*** 0.0003
DRG Weight (DWj) 0.1423 0.1756
Age (Aj) -0.0011 0.0057





Note: *** Sign at 0.01,** Sign at 0.05, *Sign at 0.1
TABLE 5.3: Modelling patients’ transfers using Equation (5.2)
negative and significant relationship between the degree of centrality and the transfers explains
the role of these indices in the model. As expressed above, the choice to control for the degree
of centrality allows us to measure the set of choices available for the hospital as sender and also
the set of potential cooperator hospitals as receiver. The negative effect indicates that when the
set of opportunity where to transfer a patient increases the number of patients sent to a specific
hospital reduces and, moreover, a destination hospital receives less patients when the number
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of hospitals in its network increases. In order to check the robustness of this result, we have
estimated the model in Equation (5.2) including different degree of centrality indices based on
several thresholds of the distances (between 20 and 40 minutes). We have observed a correlation
over 0.90 among all the predicted values estimated including these different indices.
Considering the distance between two hospitals, as expected, the shorter is the distance the
higher is the number of transfers, despite the high density of hospitals in Lombardy. This ensures
that a patient can be transferred by reducing the cost for travelling and the risks for the patient
associated to the transfer (Caimo et al. 2017, Landon et al. 2012, Mascia et al. 2012). The age
and the DRG weight do not have a significant effect on the transfers, except for the DRG weight
at origin, where the positive coefficient indicates that the patients that are transferred are the
more complicated ones. This results supports the hypothesis of an altruistic behavior.
In addition, our social relations model includes also the measure of the reciprocity between the
observations, represented by the ρ coefficient in Table 5.3. This parameter takes into account the
dyadic correlation between the observations in a pair (Hoff 2005), and its high value suggests a
high correlation between the two.
5.5 The impact of cooperation on the hospital quality
The baseline hypothesis of this study states that cooperation between hospitals improves the
overall quality in a healthcare system. In order to evaluate this hypothesis, we adopt a statistical
approach that measures the effect of the cooperation between hospitals on the hospital quality.
Quality is measured using hospital mortality, defined by a variable assuming value 1 if the patient
dies in hospital or within 30-days after the discharge, and 0 otherwise.
Considering that the observed mortality depends on the different case-mix within hospitals, we
add to the empirical strategy an evaluation of the healthcare quality to obtain a risk-adjusted
mortality. Given the binary outcome mortality, let πpj be the probability that the patient p dies
in the hospital j, with p = 1, ..., Pj the number of patients discharged from the hospital j
with j = 1, ..., J and P = P1 + ... + PJ the total number of patients admitted in Lombardy.
The hierarchical structure of the data leads to the adoption of a multilevel logistic model, as






= α+ ηXpj + u0j (5.3)
whereXpj represents a set of patients’ characteristic and u0j ∼ N(0, τ20 ) is the hospital-specific
random effect. Table 5.4 shows the results of the quality evaluation based on mortality. All the
patient’s covariates included in the model significantly affect the risk of death. This is allowing
us to obtain predicted mortality adjusted for the different case-mix hospitalized by each provider.
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Covariate Estimates Std. Error Covariate Estimates Std. Error
Female -0.180 0.010 AIDS/HIV 1.039 0.091
Age 0.072 0.000 Lymphoma 1.095 0.037
DRG Weight 0.182 0.003 Metastatic Cancer 1.702 0.018
Congestive Heart Failure 0.744 0.014 Solid Tumor Without Metastasis 0.286 0.016
Valvular Disease -0.375 0.032 Coagulopathy 1.401 0.050
Pulmonary Circulation Disorders 0.701 0.035 Weight Loss 3.193 0.029
Peripheral Vascular Disorders 0.136 0.030 Fluid and Electrolyte Disorders 0.837 0.025
Hypertension, Uncomplicated -0.656 0.026 Blood Loss Anemia -0.353 0.045
Paralysis 0.943 0.070 Deficiency Anemia -0.539 0.052
Other Neurological Disorders 0.946 0.028 Alcohol Abuse 0.244 0.049
Chronic Pulmonary Disease 0.069 0.021 Depression -0.925 0.099
Hypothyroidism -0.574 0.074 Hypertension, Complicated -0.693 0.037
Renal Failure 0.365 0.019 Constant -8.752 0.063
Liver Disease 1.256 0.026
Observations 900,151
Number of groups 145
Note: All variables are significant at 0.01
TABLE 5.4: Quality evaluation based on mortality





where π̂pi is the expected probability for patient p in hospital i given by the model in Equation
(5.3).
At this point, we define the overall quality for the hospitals i and j in terms of mortality as
Wij = Wi +Wj , (5.4)
representing the number of patients death for each hospitals’ pairs. We decided to adopt a
measure of overall quality instead of a measure of mortality split by both sender and receiver
hospitals because we are interested in estimating the impact of cooperation on the overall quality
of the healthcare system. In fact, if a hospital sends a patient with a very high risk of mortality
to another hospital and the patient dies, this increases the mortality of the receiver but does not
impact on the mortality of the pair, since the patient would have most likely died in the hospital
from which she was transferred. Considering the overall mortality allows us to take into account
the effect of the cooperation on the mortality for both the sender and receiver hospitals.
From the model described in the previous section we obtain the predicted transfer, adjusted for
a set of covariates not related to the quality, and this guarantees that the predicted transfers can
be taken as an exogenous predictor of the overall mortality.
Let then T̂ij define the number of predicted transfers between hospital i and j estimated by
the model in Equation (5.2). In order to avoid other problems of endogeneity, T̂ij is calculated
excluding the hospital random effects because they can be related with characteristics such as
the teaching status or the size of a hospital, which can affect hospital quality.
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At this point, we relate the predicted cooperation (T̂ij) with the hospital performance defined in
Equation (5.4) (Wij). This step can be formulated as a Poisson mixed effect model, and defined
as follows:
E(Wij |T̂ij , HDij , OWNij) = exp(α+ ξT̂ij + βHDij + θOWNij + ui + uj) (5.5)
where u1, ..., u145 ∼ N(0, σ2u). The coefficient ξ in Equation (5.5) is of interest in order to
demonstrate the hypothesis that the cooperation T̂ij , modelled as in Equation (5.2), increases
the hospital quality. The model is also controlled for the discharges (HD) of the hospitals’
pairs, and for their ownership (OWNij) that can be public and public or private and private,




Num of Hospital Discharges (HDij) 0.0593*** 0.0020
Private vs Private (OWNij (1)) -0.3906*** 0.0513
Public vs Private (OWNij (2)) -0.1211*** 0.0358
Private vs Public (OWNij (3)) -0.1214*** 0.0358
Note: *** Sign at 0.01,** Sign at 0.05, *Sign at 0.1
TABLE 5.5: Modelling overall mortality adjusted for predicted patients’ transfers
described in Equation (5.5). This is the core of the chapter, where we analyze the effect of coop-
eration on quality (mortality). This analysis confirms the hypothesis behind the study, showing a
negative and significant coefficient indicating that the higher is the cooperation between a pair of
hospitals the lower is the overall risk adjusted mortality for the two hospitals. In an institutional
setting affected by asymmetric information about the hospital quality, the hospitals follow their
perceived quality and their ability in building an informal network. This positive effect on the
quality means that this informal network has a positive effect for the patients, for the hospital
performance and, at the same time, increases the overall quality of the healthcare system.
The analysis is concluded by a deepening based on the hospital ownership. In specific, we want
to disentangle the differences by ownership concerning the relationship between cooperation
and quality. To do this, we add to Equation (5.5) the interactions between predicted transfers at
first stage and the hospitals’ ownerships. The result of this analysis is presented in Figure 5.2.
On the left, the heatmap represents the observed transfers between hospitals’ pairs sharing the
same ownership (public vs public on the top and private vs private at the bottom), whereas on
the right, the heatmap shows the expected mortality produced by the model in Equation (5.5),
including the aforementioned interaction, scaled by the number of discharges of the hospitals’
pairs. We observe that public hospitals are more involved in cooperation than private, whereas
in both Subfigures 5.2a and 5.2b the analysis confirms that regardless of the ownership, the
cooperation is effective in reducing mortality.
Chapter 5. The effect of cooperation on quality in healthcare 79
(a) Heatmap for public hospitals
(b) Heatmap for private hospitals
FIGURE 5.2: The effect of the patients transfers on the predicted overall mortality.
The hospitals in the heatmaps are sorted by the in-degree index and the colors of the points are
defined in the log-scale, except for the null transfers where the points are white.
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5.6 Discussion
This work has studied the informal cooperation between hospitals, analysing the determinants
of this and the effects on the hospital performance.
The analysis of the determinants of patients’ transfers is in line with the literature (Caimo et al.
2017, Lomi et al. 2014, Lomi and Pallotti 2012). Our findings show that geographical distance
between hospitals plays an important role in explaining the flows of patients between them: the
shorter the distance, the higher is the number of transfers. This result was confirmed by observ-
ing that the communities detected by the community detection method based on the network of
transfers had a clear geographical nature.
Most relevant is the effect of the degree of centrality in the explanation of the mechanisms of pa-
tients’ transfers. In our model we find that when the number of hospitals which transfer patients
to a specific hospital increases, the number of patients transferred by this hospital decreases.
This seems to say that a big receiver tends to be a small sender. We also show that the higher is
the number of opportunities where to send the patients the lower is the number of patients trans-
ferred to a specific hospital. This support the hypothesis that the choice of the hospital where
to transfer a patient is based on the appropriate solution for the patients’ needs. But this could
be also a critical point that undermines the effect we found in this work. Indeed, according to
Mascia et al. (2015), when a network is sparse and the opportunities to cooperate decrease, the
quality provided increases. In this sense a policy intervention, in a context where the number
of hospitals where to transfer the patients is high, should artificially reduce the density of the
network, i.e., addressing the transfers to a pre-identified group of hospitals. This should lead to
a better identification of the hospitals where the patients should be transferred to reduce their
risk of adverse outcomes.
The main contribution to the use of advanced statistical methods in healthcare relates to a novel
global way to analyze the effect of the inter-hospital cooperation on hospital quality. First of all,
differently from similar works (Caimo et al. 2017), we study the hospital network defined by
patients transfers, considering the dimension of the edge and not only the presence or absence
of a connection between the nodes (hospitals) in the network. Secondly, we distinguish a first
stage where we model the determinants of patients transfers, and we take care of the potential
endogeneity due to the quality. To this aim, we do not include among the covariates explaining
the patients transfers any variable which can be related with the hospital quality. In this way we
avoid a potential bias that could affect the analysis of the relationship between cooperation and
quality.
To the best of our knowledge, before this study, only the work by Mascia et al. (2015) consid-
ered the hospital quality as a dependent variable in the analysis of this topic. In contrast to their
work, we do not limit the study to the effect of the network characteristics on the quality of the
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transferring hospital, but we define a measure of quality that considers the benefits for the pa-
tients, for the hospitals and, as a consequence, for the overall healthcare system. The results in
this chapter support the hypothesis that cooperation among hospitals leads to better health out-
comes for both the origin and destination hospitals. The ownership analysis demonstrates that
public hospitals are more engaged in hospital cooperation, but that cooperation is effective also
for the private ones. In synthesis our findings encourage the hospital cooperation, suggesting
that the wide heterogeneity in hospital quality observed in the overall healthcare system, could
be reduced with a mechanism of inter-hospital cooperation (Iwashyna et al. 2009).
This chapter could have several prominent policy implications. First of all, the results show
that it is necessary and urgent to disclose information regarding hospital quality ranking com-
puted within the regional quality evaluation programme. The presence of asymmetric informa-
tion must be reduced at the patients’ level as well as at the hospital level, so that the informal
networks can be supported by this information. Furthermore, our findings suggest that policy
makers should support cooperation, involving in this process all the hospitals belonging to the
healthcare system. Moreover, policy makers should support hospitals’ networks based on geo-
graphical proximity, same administrative membership (municipality or Local Health Authority)
and hospital characteristics and abilities.
Future works can be proposed in order to increase the knowledge about the impact of hospi-
tal cooperation. First of all, the study of the hospital cooperation should be crossed with the
competition policy existing in the Lombardy region, which has been studied in Chapter 4. The
relationship between competition and cooperation should be analysed with the aim of under-
standing whether, at least in our case-study, hospital competition limits a positive hospital net-
working (Lomi and Pallotti 2012, Mascia et al. 2012).
Second, we choose one measure of cooperation, but this does not imply that the hospitals could
collaborate in several other ways. An interesting further analysis should be implemented includ-
ing different cooperation measures and also different quality indicators. For example, it could
be of interest to consider the scientific collaboration among professionals, which can be derived
by the scientific works published jointly by physicians operating in different hospitals.
Finally, in order to generalize of our findings, we would like to use similar approaches to study
hospital cooperation in different healthcare systems, where the effect of cooperation on the hos-
pital quality has not been studied. In the US, for example, where the hospitals are free to choose
where to transfer their patients, the access to a better quality hospital is not guaranteed (Iwashyna
2012, Lomi et al. 2014, Veinot et al. 2012). A further evolution of this study could analyse the
effect of cooperation on quality at different magnitude levels of the transfers’ distribution. An
approach considering a non linear dependence between quality and transfers can be adopted in
order to identify possibly different patterns for different level of transfers. Part of this distri-
bution could suggest that increasing the intensity of the informal network increases the overall
quality, but after some threshold the level of transfers could become negative for the patients




The general scope of this thesis was to shed light on the role of statistical techniques within
a healthcare quality evaluation framework. To this aim, we studied several topics which are
typical of the healthcare literature in the fields of statistics, economics and econometrics. We
highlighted how statistical methods can be used in a variety of contexts, such as to test the impact
of a market condition such as competition on the healthcare quality, to measure the causal effect
of a policy on the quality improvement, to analyse the effect of cooperation on the hospital
performance, and to measure quality in the first place. At the same time we implemented a
model framework, which demonstrated that the usual methods adopted for quality evaluation
can be improved by an advancing in statistical methodology.
In particular, in Chapter 1 we introduced the thesis, with a background on the quality in health-
care, the statistical methods used, most notably multilevel models, and the case-study consid-
ered in this thesis, which is the Lombardy region in Italy. The regional healthcare system in
Lombardy, is characterized by a population of 10 millions of citizens, where public and pri-
vate providers compete with each other, patients are free to choose where to be hospitalized,
and a pay-for-performance program based on an annual effectiveness evaluation was recently
implemented. For all these reasons we consider Lombardy region a relevant case-study.
In Chapter 2 a methodological extension of the cluster weighted models is presented. This
statistical framework introduced in the literature by Ingrassia et al. (2012) is a generalization of
the widespread finite mixture models. Although multilevel models are widely used for hospital
evaluations, to disentangle observed heterogeneity at the hospital and ward level, they are not
able to identify the presence of latent heterogeneity. This can be overcome by the adoption of a
finite mixture of regression models, but in this case the observed heterogeneity due to the patients
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clustering within hospitals is avoided. Differently from these approaches, the cluster weighted
multilevel models allow us to consider the presence of both latent and known heterogeneity.
The exploration of this new modelling approach demonstrated the ability of cluster weighted
models to disentangle the latent groups within the individual data in a healthcare context and a
good performance in terms of model fitting both on simulated and real data. Finally, the hospital
league tables performed using a cluster weighted approach were shown to improve the quality
of the performance evaluation in healthcare.
Policy evaluation based on advanced statistical methods is a relevant topic for the healthcare
sector. In Chapter 3 we exploited a recent reform in Lombardy which introduced a pay-for-
performance program aimed at increasing the hospital quality. We evaluated the causal effect
of this policy using a difference-in-differences approach. Difference-in-differences is one of the
most used approach in the policy evaluation context in order to disentangle the causal impact
of a policy, but it requires that the design of a quasi-experimental framework respects some
assumptions. In particular the treated and untreated groups of observations must be independent
from each other and the difference between treated and untreated units in the period before the
policy implementation has to be constant (parallel trend). Using a logistic linear mixed model
we evaluated the effect of the implementation of the pay-for-performance program on multiple
outcomes while accounting for the heterogeneity of the data at the multiple nested levels. The
results demonstrated the positive effect of the policy, in particular for those outcomes that can be
more influenced by a managerial activity. This finding is relevant for an international audience,
due to the limited adoption of the pay-for-performance programs and moreover to the limited
evaluation of those existent.
In Chapter 4 we aimed at evaluating the effect of competition between hospitals on the hospital
performance. We introduced this economic concept and we presented how this topic is defined
within the healthcare sector. Furthermore, we summarized the huge literature on competition in
healthcare. The main research question in this chapter was to understand the role of competition
in the Lombardy healthcare quasi-market, and to contribute to the general literature by analyzing
the effect of asymmetric information. In this context asymmetric information is due to the fact
that the citizens and the GPs do not have accurate information about the hospital quality and they
cannot use this information in order to choose the hospital where to be admitted. This condition
can reduce the effect of pro-competition reforms on quality. The main result of this chapter
confirms most of the evidence in the literature, namely that competition does not influence on
the hospital quality. Our analysis may contribute to the empirical literature, explaining why often
the result that more competition improves the quality in healthcare is rejected. We concluded
that a public disclosure of the hospital quality could impact on the overall performance of the
healthcare system.
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Chapter 5 is dedicated to the cooperation in healthcare. Literature on the effects of cooperation
in healthcare is limited, and researchers are mostly focused on competition between hospitals,
disregarding the existence of collaboration among providers. Starting from the idea that the
hospitals and the physicians act as an altruistic economic agent, in Chapter 5 we analyse hospital
cooperation in a competitive environment and we measure if cooperation increases hospital
quality. We contribute to the lack of the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, we used
the patients’ transfers as a measure of cooperation and we adopted a social relations model
from the network modelling literature to detect the determinants of cooperation. Secondly,
we estimated if the network between hospitals has an effect on the overall mortality, i.e. on
the quality provided by both the origin and destination hospital. The positive findings of this
analysis showed that hospital cooperation should be supported by policy makers in order to
stimulate the improvement of the healthcare systems.
This thesis suffers from some relevant limitations, apart from those included in each chapter,
many of which related to the data and design of the study. First of all, in this thesis we are con-
sidering a single case study (Lombardy) and this is a limit for the generalizations of our results.
Furthermore, Lombardy is a particular case in the context of the healthcare. In fact, Lombardy is
a region which can organize its proper healthcare system, but is included in a national healthcare
system. This situation makes a study on Lombardy different from typical study in healthcare
literature, where, usually, national healthcare systems are treated. In Lombardy for example
the opportunity to attract extraregional patients can influence the cooperation within the region,
and this is not a condition affecting national healthcare systems. Furthermore, in Lombardy the
hospital density is not uniformly distributed over all the region. The metropolitan area of Milan
is characterized for including the majority of the hospitals and the 30% of the population. In this
sense, considering for example chapter 5, it could be that transfers are less risky within Milan
compared to the rest of the region. Considering, instead, chapter 4, the higher level of hospital
density in Milan increase the level of competition in this area, compared to the rest of the re-
gional territory. One more limitation concerns the data availability. In fact, in all the analysis
we must consider only hospitalizations for patients living in Lombardy, because, after they are
discharged, we are not able to collect data for patients living in other regions but hospitalized
in Lombardy. This implies for example that we are not able to detect if they die 30 days after
the discharge or if they are re-admitted in another hospital. For this reason we are loosing the
10% of the information in our analysis, without loss of generality, but excluding a substantial
part of hospitalizations. Other limitations, in particular for chapter 4 and 5, concerns that using
observational data we are unable to make inferences about causation, therefore, effect estimates
should be cautiously interpreted. Furthermore, as with other studies using administrative data,
information was lacking on potential confounding variables such as lifestyle factors. Despite
this, the use of administrative data has been widely adopted in healthcare literature because such
data, compared to clinical registries, are easily accessible, relatively inexpensive to use, and
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enable information to be collected on the entire population. Other variables that are important
to the analysis might have being omitted or unmeasured in this thesis such as information on
patients that may die before reaching the hospital, which could provide indication on whether
hospital patient populations differ across in terms of opportunity to be assisted in a limited time
after the clinical event, which is one of the main driver of mortality in chapter 4.
6.2 Recommendation for future research
In this thesis we explored a wide range of topics in healthcare using several statistical techniques.
The results in Chapter 2 should encourage policy makers and researchers who deal with quality
evaluation to exploit model based clustering approaches. We introduced the multilevel logistic
cluster weighted model as a tool for disentangling latent heterogeneity in the data, improving the
quality evaluation. In order to enhance the opportunities of using this model framework, cluster
weighted multilevel models should be developed for count data. At the same time, our model is
limited in disentangling the latent heterogeneity at patient level. One of the main developments
consists on a cluster weighted multilevel model able to detect clusters at hospital level.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 demonstrated that statistics is a resource which can be exploited in or-
der to study respectively the causal effect of the policies and hospital competition on the quality
of cares. Concerning Chapter 3, we observed that the pay-for-performance programs are limited
and most of the times their effect on hospital quality is not evaluated on the basis of a causal
inference framework. It would be interesting to test the impact of the P4P program in terms of
outcomes directly related to the performance of the hospital physicians. Furthermore, It would
be useful to compare the P4P program in Lombardy with neighbouring regions which do not
implement a P4P program. Finally, different dimensions of the quality should be investigated,
i.e. efficiency. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the asymmetric information should be considered
when the effect of the hospital competition on quality is evaluated. Furthermore, we suggest
the opportunity to study the effect of the hospital competition on the efficiency, which is a topic
that received a reduced attention in the scientific literature. We also suggest to compare the
effect of the hospital competition on quality in Lombardy with the effect of competition in other
Italian regions where we do not expect the presence of competition due to the different health-
care system’s rules. Finally, in Chapter 5 we summarized a novel contribution to the literature
concerning hospital cooperation. There is an evident lack in the scientific literature in terms of
papers analyzing the hospital cooperation. We hope that this work stimulate researchers in ex-
ploring this area of healthcare sector. Moreover, there is also a lack of the literature on statistical
networks dedicated to the healthcare sector. Healthcare is a framework where stakeholders are
naturally connected (i.e. hospitals with hospitals, GPs with hospitals, patients with patients) and
we consider that the scientific literature on health economics and health statistics could benefit
by a most extended adoption of statistical network analysis for study the healthcare sector. In
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any case, future works should analyse the underlying mechanisms of the hospital cooperation,
and different measure of competition should be tested and compared with the patients’ transfers.
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